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THE LAW GOVERNING AN ORIGINAL PACKAGE.
In the December number (1889) of THE AMERICAN LAW
(volume 28, pages 733-747), the constructions put
upon the Commerce Clause of the Constitution at different
periods during the first Century of the existence of the Supreme
Court were reviewed for the purpose of demonstrating the
safety of our dual systems of government, under the various
decisions which necessarily called for some particular limitation upon either the National or the State authority. The
decision of the so-called Original Package Case, since the
publication of that article, calls for a more extended review of
the cases actually decided, and this, in their order of time, and
with the simple object of setting forth the settled law especially governing the transmission of merchandise from State to
State for the purpose of sale.
REGISTER

I.
The agencies established by the Articles of Conederationwere
not entitled to the dignzfied appellation of government: Mc
LEAN, J.
License Cases (1847), 5 How. (46 U. S.) 587.
The Articles of Confederation, which were ratified by State
after State, from 1777 to March Ist, 1781, when Maryland
gave her ratification, provided-
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ARTICLE II. Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.

The effect of this clause, and the care taken to avoid the
same effect in the Constitution, were thus stated by Marshall :But there is no phrase in the instrument [the Constitution] which, like
the Articles of Confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers ; and
which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely
described. Even the Tenth Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits
the word " expressly," and declares only that the powers "not delegated
to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the
States or to the people ;" thus leaving the question, whether the particular
power which may become the subject of contest, has been delegated to
the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument. The men who drew and adopted this
amendment had experienced the embarrassments resulting from the insertion of this word in the Articles of Confederation, and probably omitted
it to avoid those embarrassments: (MeCulloclh v. The State of 1Taryland
el al.,4 Wheat. 17 U. S. 4o6.)

The breadth of this clause may be understood from the
sentiments of Justice BALDWIN, in his concurring opinion in
the Miln case, infra.
In the Declaration of Rights in 1774, Congress expressly admitted the
authority of such acts of Parliament " as were bonafde restrained to the
regulation of external commerce, for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother country, and the
commercial benefits of its respective members; excluding every idea of
taxation, internal or external, for raising a revenue on the subject in
America, without their consent." But in admitting this right, they asserted the free and exclusive power of "legislation in their several provincial legislatures, in all cases of taxation and internal polity, subject
only to the negative of their sovereign, as has been heretofore used and
accustomed." Taxation was not the only fear of the colonies, as an incident or means of regulating external commerce ; it was the practical
consequences of making it a pretext of assuming the power of interfering
with their "internal policy," changing their "internal police," "the
regulation thereof," "of intermeddling with our provisions for the support of civil government, or the administration of justice." The States
were equally afraid of intrusting their delegates in Congress with any
powers which should be so extended by implication, or construction, of
which the instructions of Rhode Island, in May, 1776, are a specimen:
"Taking the greatest care to secure to this Colony, in the strongest and
mostperfect-manner, its present form and all powers ofgovernment, so far
as it relates to its internal police, and conduct of our own officers, civil and
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religious." In consenting to a declaration of independence, the Convention of Pennsylvania added this proviso, that " the forming the government, and regulating the internal police of the colony, be always reserved
(Bald. Views, 182.)
to the people of the colony:"

Police Power.
The question of the police power of the States cannot be
fully entered into here for want of space, but it is necessary to
observe what is meant by this phrase. To a mind constituted
like that of Chief Justice TANEY, the police power is nothing
more or less than the sovereign power - (License Cases, 5 How.
46 U. S. 583.) This seems to have been the opinion of Justice MATTHEWS in Bowman v. Chicago & IV. WV R. Co. 125 U.
S. 497, 498, when he held the Iowa Statute to be void because not an exercise of jurisdiction over persons and property
within the State, but without; if the railroad company
and liquors offered for transportation had been wholly within
the State, then they would have been the subject not merely of
laws for the benefit of health and morals, but also of certain
arbitrary policies looking to local benefit alone; to all of
these, the police power would extend. Chief Justice FULLER
quoted these sentiments with approval in the opinion of the
Court in the Original Package Case, thereby confirming a
political terminology already introduced; whereby sovereignty
is an attribute of the nation, while the police power expresses
all the authority reserved by the Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution to the States respectively as distinguished from
the people.
Chief Justice WAITE, in .71min v. Illinois (1877), 94 U. S.
113, 125, applied this broad definition to the State regulation
of grain elevator charges, which was sustained as an exercise
of constitutional authority over the conduct of one citizen
towards another, in the use of private property, for the public
good. And, in Stone v. Mississippi,(1879) II Otto (IO U. S.)
814, the Chief Justice affirmed the application of this power
to the suppression of a lottery claiming protection for its
charter as a contract: the protection was denied, by confining it to property, as distinguished from governmental rights,
and the explanation given, that-
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Many attempts have been made in this Court and elsewhere, to define
the police power, but never with entire success. ** * * But the power
of governing is a trust, committed by the people to the government, no
part of which can be granted away. The people, in their sovereign capacity, have established their agencies for the preservation of the public
health and the public morals, a'nd the protection of public and private
rights. These several agencies can govern according to their discretion,
if within the scope of their general authority, while in power; but they
cannot give. away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after
them, in respect to matters the government of which, from the very nature of things, must "vary with varying circumstances:"
(ii Otto, iox
U. S., 818, 820.)

Justice HARLAN, in the Oleomargarine case ofPowellv. Pennsylvania (18875, 127 U. S. 678, 685, sustained the State law,
forbidding the manufacture of oleomargarine, on the ground
that the legislative power to promote the general welfare was
veiy great and the legislative discretion in the execution of
that power was very large: and this, notwithstanding the dissenting opinion by Justice FIELD, pointed out that this particular law was really founded upon the competency of the
legislature to prescribe what articles of food, out of many
equally healthy, might not be sold: (Id. 689-go.) This Oleomargarine case expressly followed Mugler v. Kansas (1887), 123
U. S. 623, which in turn followed Barbierv. Connelly, of which
the important sentence is quoted, at the bottom of this page.
Justice GRAY, in Wurts v. Hoagland (I884), 114 U. S. 6o6,
thus sustained a drainage law, as a constitutional exercise of
legislative power, without reference to the right of Eminent
Domain or the power of suppressing a nuisance.
Justice FIELD, notwithstanding his views in the Oleomargarine and other cases (infra page 413), recognized this view
in the San Francisco laundry case, when considering the effect
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States upon a local ordinanceBut neither the Amendment, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any
other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the State,
sometimes termed its "police power," to prescribe regnlations to promote
health, peace, morals,
and good order of the people,
and tothe
legislate so as to increase education
the industries of the State, develope its
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity : Barbierv. Connolly (x884),
113 U. S. 27, 31.
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413

In the language of Justice HARLAN, (AT. 0. G. L. Co. v. La.
L. & H..P.&M. Co. (1885), 115 U. S. 250, 661), this defines
the police'power, in the broadest sense, to include all legislation and almost every function of civil government.
Sic 2ttere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
Those who regard the police power as something not
touched by the Constitution, distinguish between the ordinary
powers of government and those especially relating to good
morals and the public health. This distinction is largely used
in most of the opinions in the License Cases,especially in those
portions of these opinions which are quoted by Justice GRY
in his dissenting opinion in the OriginalPackage Case (infra).
How far there can be an agreement in holding this view of the
-police powers of the States, may appear by a quotation from
the opinion of Justice FIELD, concurring with the majority of
the Court in the Bowman case (infra)The reserved power of the States, in the regulation of their internal affairs, must be exercised consistently with the exercise of the powers delegated to the United States. If there be a conflict, the powers delegated
must prevail, being so much authority taken from the States by the express sanction of their people; for the Constitution itself declares that
laws made in pursuance of it, shall be the supreme law of the land. But
those powers which authorize legislation touching the health, morals,
good order and peace of their people, were not delegated, and are so essential to the existence and prosperity of the States, that it is not to be
presumed that they will be encroached upon so as to impair their reasonable exercise: (125 U. S. 503)

The language of the same Justice, in his dissenting opinion
in Munn v. Illinois, will make the meaning of the last sentence
more distinct. There, he was speaking of the Fourteenth
Amendment and usual State constitutional guarantees, that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law, and he distinguished the methods of exercising
the power of the State over private property into three classes,
the last being what is usually known as the police powerThe State may take his property for public uses, upon just compensation being made therefor.
It may take a portion of his property by way of taxation for the support
of the government.
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It may control the use and possession of his property so far as may be
necessary for the protection of the rights of others, and to secure to them
the equal use and enjoyment of their property. The doctribre that each
one must so use his own as to not injure his neighbor-Sic tere luo ze
alienunm non laedas-is the rule by which every member of society must
possess and enjoy his property: and all legislation essential to secure
this common and equal enjoyment is a legitimate exercise of State
-xcept in cases where property may be destroyed to arrest a
authority.
conflagration or the ravages of pestilence, or be taken under the pressure
of immediate and overwhelming necessity to prevent a public calamity,
the power of the State over the property of the citizen does not extend
beyond such limits: (94 U. S. 145.)

Naturally, Justice FIELD also dissented in the Oleomargarine
Butter case (Powell v. Pennsylvania, 1887, 127 U. S. 678);
and while concurring with the majority of the Court in Bowman v. Chzicago & N. W. RR. Co. (1887), 125 U. S. 465, 501,
took .care to add that the police powers could not be used to
define an article of commerce.
This definition of the police power is agreement with the
sentiments of Justice WOODBURY, in the License Cases (1847),
5 How. (46 U. S.) 627; Justice GRIER, Id., 631 ; Justice MCLEAN, in thePassengerCases (1849), 7 How. (48 U. S.) 283, 398,
400; Justice STRONG, in Hannibal& St. j. RR. Co. v. Z-usen
(877) 95 U. S. 465, 471; Justice MILLER, in The Slaughter
House Cases (1873), 16 Wall. (83 U.S .) 36, and forgan's RR.
&S. Co. v. La. (1886), I8 U. S. 455, 464; and many other
Judges in cases where there is no interstate commerce question involved.
The distinction between the two views of the police power
is important in all cases where the right of Congress to regulate commercial intercourse, comes into collision with an assertion of State authority excused by being an exercise of the
police power. Not that there can be any doubt of the supremacy of the Constitution and the constitutional laws of the
United States: infra, page 425. But there is a professional
and consequently a lay discontent with opinions sustaining the
Commerce powers of the Union, when they are examined by
the solitary touchstone of these police powers of the States.
This is probably due to the superficial thought that these
powers are not among those delegated to the United States.
From the position of TANEY and WAITE and FULLER, there is
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no weakening of State sovereignty, as commonly understood
by any decision favorable to commerce among the States :
the National power was granted in 1789, though possibly not
used until I89O, and the rules of sixty years ago are now enforced in much the same way they were when originally applied.
The General Welfare includes an intercourse of botl persons
andproperty.
The Articles of Confederation further provided, thatApIcLrcr IV. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship
and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union,
the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers,,vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges andimmunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State
shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall
enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subjectto the same
duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively,
provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State of which
the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no impostion, duties or
restriction shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States,
or either of them.

This clause, in a much abbreviated form, is now the First
Clause of the Second Section of the Fourth Article of the
Constitution (infra); and, in the latter form, is alluded to in
Gibbons v. Ogden (infra) as the equal rights clause. The
connection of this clause with interstate commerce arises from
its object, here avowed to be for the security and perpetuity,
not of mutual friendship alone, but of that interested kind
which arises from intercourse. This last word was much discussed until the decision in the Passenger Cases (infra) fixed
its definition. At that point in this article, the definition will
be examined.
The power to regulateforeign commerce by treaty, always belonged to the generalgovernment.
The Articles of Confederation further provide, thatARTIcr. IX. The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power of * **.* entering into treaties and
alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby tir-i
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legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing
such imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own people' are subjected
to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of
goods or commodities whatsoever ** * *.

This clause was commented upon by Chief Justice MARin Brown v. Maryland, at the very inception of that
part of his opinion where he discussed the conflict between a
tax upon an importer and the Commerce clause of the Constitution (Art. I. Sec. 8).

SHALL,

The oppressed and degraded state of commerce previous to the adoption
of the Constitution can scarcely be forgotten. It was regulated by foreign
nations with a single view to their own interests; and our disunited efforts
to counteract their restrictions were rendered impotent by want of combination. Congress, indeed, possessed the power of making treaties; but
the inability of the Federal government to enforce them, had become so
apparent as to render that power in a great degree useless. Those who
felt the injury arising from this state of things, and those who were capable of estimating the influence of commerce on the prosperity of nations,
perceived the necessity of giving the control over this important subject
to a single government. It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding from the feebleness of the Federal government contributed more
to that great revolution which introduced the present system, than the
deep and general conviction that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress. It is not, therefore, a matter of surprise that the grant should be
as extengive as the mischief, and should comprehend all foreign commerce and all commerce among the States. To construe the power so as
to impair its efficacy, would tend to defeat an object in the attainment of
which the American public took, and justly took, that strong interest
which arose from a full conviction of its necessity: (12 Wheat. 25 U S.

445-6.)
A legal definition of" Commerce" was soon called for in
the case of Gibbons v. Ogden (znfra); to that place the con-sideration of this word, in its constitutional sense, may be deLerred.
The effect of a treaty upon foreign commerce, was much
<iscussed in the Passenger Cases (1849), 7 Howard (48 U. S.)
283, but no decision reached as the laws of Massachusetts and
-New York were declared to be in conflict with the commerce
-clauses of the Constitution, aside from any national law or
-treaty. The supremacy of a treaty is secured by the Sixth
Article of the Constitution, but the language of the Constitu-tion implies that the validity of a treaty is bounded only by
the "authority of the United States," and so extensive a sub-
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sect must be omitted here, for future consideration.
Story, Const. § 1841, and notes by Cooley.)

(See i

II.

The construction of the Constitution should be influenced, in
cases of doubt, by tie objects sought in the adoption of the instrument, and its declarationof supremacy within its own sphere.
As soon as drafted, and ever since, there has been a dispute
over the method of interpreting the language of the Constitution. Some consideration must necessarily be given to this
fundamental principle, and there is here gathered a statement
of the views expressed or quoted by the jurists of the country
with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution especially before them.
State Taxation of Commerce.
Commenting upon the power of taxation given by the Constitution, Hamilton arguedAn entire consolidation of the States into one complete National sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever
powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the
general will. But as the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial
union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the
.rights 6f sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that
act, exclusively delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation,
-or rather this alienation of State sovereignty, would only exist in three
cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive
authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to
the Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like
-authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to
which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant. I use these terms to distinguish this last
case from another which might appear to resemble it, but which would,
in fact, be essentially different: I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interference6 in the
policy of any branch of administration, but would not imply any direct
contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority: The
Federalist, No. 32 (No. 31 of Dawson's ed.).

In connection with these palliating sentences of Hamilton,
it is to be observed that the result of the principles of 171cCullough v. The State of Maryland (1819), 4 Wheat. (I7U. S.)
TOL. XXXVII.-27.
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36, affirmed and applied to importations from both foreign
and sister States in Brown v. The State of M17aryland (znfra),
subordinates the power of every State in respect to taxation,
to the Constitution of the Union and the construction put
upon it by the National Supreme Court. Similarly, there result from the principles of Gibbons v. Ogden (infra),affirmed
and applied in the Passenger Cases (infra), the same subordination of the State taxing power, in respect to persons and
the instruments of commerce. All of these principles are
more fully considered a few pages later, under the appropriate
sections of the Constitution.
A Strict Constrnctionimproper.
When Chief Justice MARSHALL came to read the opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden, infra, he found it worth while to begin with
this preliminary remark, in relation to the Constitution,The instrument contains an enumeration of powers expresslygranted by
the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought
to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is
there one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance to this
rule? In the last ofthe enumerated powers, that which grants, expressly,
the means of carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized
"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for the purpose.
But this limitation on the means which may be used, is not extended to
the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the Constitution, which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which
we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. * * * If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the
extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects for
which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the
instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction: (9
Wheat. 22 U. S. 188.)

Three years later, when the Chief Justice came to decide
Brown v. Maryland, he made another preliminary remark
worthi of attentionIn performing the delicate and important duty of construing clauses
in the Constitution of our country, which involve conflicting powers of the
government of the Union, and of the respective States, it isproper to take
a view of the literal meaning of the words to be expounded, of their connection with other words, and of the general objects to be accomplished
by the prohibitory clause, or by the gratnt of power: (t2 Vheat. 25 U. S.
437-)
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Previously when writing the opinion in ilfcCuiougit v. Miryland, in 1819, the question of an implied power came under
discussion, as there was no direct grant of power to Congress
to incorporate a bank; the power was sustained and the rule
thus declared:We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are
limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the
sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the National legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it
cofifers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to the end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit

of the Constitution, are constitutional:
land etal., 4 Wheat. 17 U. S. 421.)

(ifcCullochk v. The State offrary-

Justice JOHNSON, in his concurring opinion in Gibbons v.
Ogden, gave another objection to the too prevalent strict construction ruleIn attempts to construe the Constitution, I have never found muchbenefit resulting from the inquiry, whether the whole, or any part of it, is.
to be construed strictly, or literally. The simple, classical, precise, yet.
comprehensive language in which it is couched, leaves, at most, but verylittle latitude for construction ; and when its intent and meaning is discovered, nothing remains but to execute the will of those who made it, in
the best manner to effect the purposes intended. The great and paramount purpose, was to unite this mass of wealth and power, for the pro-tection of the humblest individual ; his rights, civil and political, his interests and prosperity, are the sole end; the rest are nothing but.
means. But the principal of those Vleans, one so essential as
to approach nearer the characteristics of an end, was the independence and harmony of the States, that they may the bettersubserve the purposes of cherishing and protecting the respective families.
of this great republic: (9 Wheat. 22 U. S. 223.)

Fourteen years later, Justice BALDWIN was called upon to
decide the question of an implication from the constitutional
power of the Supreme Court over controversies between two
or more States. Justice BALDWIN'S views were quite diverse
from those of MARSHALL, (see under the Miln Case, infra),
and yet he too admitted the necessity of recognizing impliec
powers That some degree of implitation must be given to words, is a proposition of universal adoption: implication is but another term for meaning

.420
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and intention apparent in the writing, on judicial inspection; "the evldent consequence" (I Bl. CoM. 250), "or some necessary consequence
resulting from the law," (Ld. Chan. in Bfi. Sodor v. Derby, (I751,) 2 Ves.
Sen. 357), or the words of an instrument, in the construction of which the
words, the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them, are
.all to be taken into view. (MARSHALL, C. J., McCulloch v. Maryland,
(1819), 4Wheat. 17 U. S. 415; BA.LDWIN,J., U. S. v. Arredondo el. al.,(S32),
6 Peters, 31 U. S. 739, 741-) Such is the sense in which the common eCxpression is used in the books, "express words or necessary implication,"
.such as arise on the words taken in connection with other sources of conatruction ; but not by conjecture, supposition, or mere reasoning on the
meaning or intention of the writing * * * * In the construction of the
Constitution, we must look to the history of the times, and examine the
state of things existing when it was framed and adopted (iVMARS1rATI,, C.
J., in Ogden v. Saunders, (1827), 12 Wheat. 25 U. S. 354; Cohens v. Vir.ginia, (1821), 6 Wheat.I9 U. S. 416; Craig el. al. v. Missouri, (1830,) 4
Peters, 29 U. S. 431, 432), to ascertain the old law, the mischief and the
remedy: (R/hodelslandv. Mass., (1838), 12 Peters, 37 U. S. 723.)
III.

The regulation of foreign and interstate commerce is exclusively vested in Congress, and the States may not legislate upon
any subject entering-into such commerce, unless the regulation is
of a particularsubject which does not require a generalor uniform system and Congress has not directed otherwise.
The Constitution provides, in Article OneSEcTION 8. The Congress shall have power * * * * * * To regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
"
* * *
the Indian Tribes; * *
This section is devoted exclusively to defining the powers
conferred upon Congress: MILLER, J., Morg,-an's RR. & S. Co.

v. La. (I886), II8U.S.445,467. Its meaning is not expressed
in obscure language, and the words being selected with no
intention to conceal power, must be understood in their natural
sense: MARSHALL, C. J., Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), 9 Wheat.,
(22 U. S.) 188; LAMAR, J., Kidd v. Pearson (1888), 128 U. S.
I, 20.
The word "Regulate" was made the ground of an argument
in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, where it was said that the right
to pass from State to State was not conferred by the Constitution,
but by a higher law which every civilized man acknowledges.
From this, the inference was drawn that the Congress might
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regulate the right but that the State might annihilate it. TheCourt assented to the former proposition,but denied the conclusion drawn as contrary to the more obvious conclusion that the
power to exercise the license conferred by the regulation, must
imply the continuance of the right which has been regulated.
by the license: (9 Wheat. 22 U. S. 211, 212.)
It will be observed that this early application of the heretical doctrine of nullification was made in a case arising in the
State of New York- and by an advocate for a monopoly.
It was repeated in the License Case of Pierce et al. v. New.
Hampshire (1847), 5 How. (46 U. S.) 5o4, 6oo, where the State
Court appeared to Justice CATRON to have assumed that the
State had the power to declare any article of commerce to be
deleterious to good morals and the public health, and consequently removed from that lawful commerce which Congress
could regulate. Of course, this could not be, and yet the
reasonable solution of the difficulty appeared alike to Justice
CATRON (ubi supra and Justice GRAY dissenting (in the Orzgina
Package Case), to be the construction of KENT, that the
State might legislate until Congress interfered. Such solution
preserves the power of local self-government, dear alike to the
believer in the doctrine of States' Rights and of a strong National government. This solution did not become the law, as
the State of New York first, and afterwards Massachusetts,
compelled the Court, in the Passenger Cases, 1849 (infra), to.
adopt a construction which would preserve the constitutional
power of Congress and yet leave the subjects of pilotage,.
quarantine, and the like, under the control of the various
States. Congress did not act, perhaps from the curious objections of the slaveholders to a construction of the word Commerce which would include Negroes, and some of the States
showed the strongest disposition to place destructive restraints
upon commerce. The principles of MARSHALL were therefore
fully carried out by his successors of quite different political
principles, and in such a line of cases as to fix the interpretation of the commerce clause of the Constitution in the manner
expressed at the head of this section.
Upon the general subject of the extent of this constitutional
power, Justice JOHNSON, in his concurring opinion in Gibbons v.
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Ogden, alluded to the well known condition of commercial
affairs prior to the adoption ofthe Constitution, and concluded
that the grant was of the supreme and exclusive power of
each State, without regard to mere verbal criticism. In
his own language,The history of the times will, therefore, sustain the opinion that the
grant of power over commerce, if intended to be commensurate with the
evils existing, and the purpose of remedying those evils, could be only
commensurate with the power of the States over the subject. And this
opinion is supported by a very remarkable evidence of the general understanding of the whole American people, when the grant was made * * *
* * * * By common consent, those [State] laws dropped lifeless from their
statute books, for want of the sustaining power, that had been relinquished
to Congress: (9 Wheat. 22 U. S. 225-6.)

This construction of the word "Regulate" was approved
by Justice BALDWIN in his concurring opinion in The Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia (1831), 5 Peters (30 U. S.) 44; and was the
basis of Chief Justice FULLER'S opinion in the Original Package Case, infra. It is open, of course, to the uncertainty admitted by Justice McLEANNo one has yet drawn the line clearly, because, perhaps, no one can
draw it, between the commercial power of the Union and the municipal
power of a State. Numerous cases have arisen, involving these powers,
-which have been decided, but a rule has necessarily been observed as applicable to the circumstances of each case and so must every case be adjudged: (Passenger Cases, 1849, 7 How. 48 U. S. 4o2.)

The same feeling of uncertainty was expressed by Chief
Justice WAITE (supra, pages 411-2) as late as 1879, and now

in the OriginalPackage Case, the present Chief Justice admits
that in the absence of congressional regulation, the line bounding the power of a State over merchandise and persons from
another State or a foreign country, must be laboriously traced
from point to point as cases are determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Such is the course pursued in this
article, and the resulting information is summed up at its
close, just before the OriginalPackage Case is printed.
There is no restraintupon Congress in choosing the means of
reguinhzgforeg-n and interstate commerce.
Congress has a general power, which has been the subject
of much controversy:-
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To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof: (Art. i, 8, last clause.)

When Chief Justice MARSHALL was discussing the arguments advanced against the powers of the Bank of the United
States, he met that most relied upon, by a consideration of the
word "necessary" in this and in the Tenth Section of the First
Article bf the Constitution:Almost all compositions contain words, which, taken in their rigorous
sense, would convey a meaning different from that which is obviously intended. It is essential to just construction, that many words which import something excessive should be understood in a more mitigated sense
-in that sense which common usage justifies. The word "necessary" is
of this description. It has not a fixed character, peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison, and is often connected with other words,
which increase or diminish the impression the mind receives,the urgency
it imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or
indispensably necessary. To no mind would the same idea be conveyed
by these several phrases. This comment on the word is well illustrated by
the passage cited at the bar, from the ioth section of the ist article of the
,Constitution. It is, we think, impossible to compare the sentence which
-prohibits a State from laying "imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws,"
-with that which authorizes Congress "to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the powers of the general government without feeling a conviction that the convention understood itself to change materially the meaning of the word " necessary,"
%y prefixing the word "absolutely."
This word, then, like others, isused
in various senses, and, in its construction, the subject, the context, the
intention of the person using them, are all to be taken into view : (lMcCulloch v. The State of Marylandel. al. (1819), 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 414,
415.)

This was merely a more extended statement of the same
thought, which the Chief Justice had expressed fourteen years
earlier, in upholding the preference claimed by the United
States, out of a bankrupt's estateIn construing this clause, it would be incorrect and would produce endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no law was
authorized which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power.
Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose, it might be
said with respect to each, that it was not necessary, because the end might
be obtained by other means. Congress must possess the choice of means,
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and must be empowered to use any means which are, in fact, conducive
to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution: Fisher v. Blight,
(1805) 2 Cranch (6 U. S.) 358, 396.

These sentiments, with those already printed on pages 418,
419, supra, were affirmed in a series of cases culminating in the
Legal Tender Case (1883), 110 U. S. 421, where Justice FIELDalone dissented from the majority of the Court composed of
WAITE, C. J., and MILLER, BRADLEY, HARLAN, WOODS,
MATTHEWS, GRAY (who delivered the opinion) and BLATCHFORD, JJ.

Congress must deal equally witlk the commerce of different
States.
The First Article of the Constitution also provides,-SecTION 9. No tax or duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State.
No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue
to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vesselsboundto,
or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.

This section is devoted to restraints upon the power of Congress and the Executive: MILLER, J. Morgan's RR.& S.
Co. v. La (1886), II8 U. S. 455, 467; its effect upon State
regulations may be deferrrd until the consideration of the case
of Nulnn v. Illinois,infra.
When Chief Justice Marshall was defining commerce to
mean not merely traffic but also intercourse, including navigation, he found additional confirmation in his construction of
this term, "commerce," from the preceding words of the
Ninth Section,It is a rule of construction, acknowledged by all, that the exceptions
from a power mark its extent; for it would be absurd, as well as useless,
to except from a granted power, that which was not granted-that which
the words of the grant could not comprehend. If, then, there are in the
Constitution plain exceptions from the power over navigation, plain inhibitions to the exercise of that power in a particular way, it is a proof
that those who made these exceptions, and prescribed these inhibitions,
understood the power to which they applied as being granted.

This method of construction was used in defining what commerce was interstate: Gibbons v. Ogden, infra.

AN ORIGINAL PACKAGE.

Express restraints ipon the States.
The First Article of the Constitution further provides,SEc=ION Io. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any
imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce
of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be
for the use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall
be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.
No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, * * * .

This section is devoted to restraints upon the powers of the
States: MILLER, J. Horgan's RR. & S. Co. v. La. (1886),
I IS U. S. 455, 467; and the extent to which a State may
require inspection, will be considered with the case of Turner
v. Maryland, infi a.

The police power of the States, minust yield to the commerciat
power of the United States.
The provisions of a portion of the Sixth Article of the Constitution are also worthy of note hereThis Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in
the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

When Chief Justice MARSHALL came to that point in his
opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, where he proposed to treat
the question before the Court as one of collision between the
National navigation laws and the State grant to Livingston and
Fitch, he was met by the argument that these laws were, in
fact, equal opposing powers. To this came the clear expositionBut the framers of our Constitution foresaw this state of things, and provided for it, by declaring the supremacy, not only of itself, but of the laws
made in pursuance of it. The nullity of any act inconsistent with the
Constitution, is produced by the declaration that the 6onstitution is the
supreme law. The appropriate application of that part ofthe clause which
confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the
State legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but, though enacted in
the execution of acknowledged State powers, interfere with, or are con-
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trary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution, or
some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In every
such case the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the
State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must
yield to it: (9 Wheat. 22 U. S. 2Io-l.)

The foundation for these remarks had been securely laid
five years previous, while discussing the effect of the powers
of the National government upon State taxation, in the case of
McCullouglk v. The State of MJfaryland, decided in I8I9 and reported in 4 Wheat. (I7 U. S.) 3 16.
It is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments as to exempt its own operations from their own influence. This effect need not be stated in terms. It is so involved in the
declaration of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, that the expression
of it could not make it more certain. We must, therefore, keep it in view
while construing the Constitution: (Id. 427.)

The words of the Constitution being given their obvious
meaning, the police power of the States has been constantly
restrained by the supremacy of the United States in those
particulars, where power has been directly or impliedly conferred on the National government: SWAYNE, J., N. W. Fert.
Co. v. Hyde Park (1878), 7 Otto (97 U. S.), 659, 663 ; FULLER,
C. J., and GRAY, J., in the Orninal Package Case, infra, citing
many cases.
Police powers are not delegated to the United States, and not
prohibited to the States, and consequently are ;reserved to the
States.
Article Tenth of the Amendments, was adopted with the
others, by the concurrence of the requisite number of the
States, December 15, 1791 ; it provides thatThe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.

The word "expressly" is not contained in this Amendment
and the explanation of its absence has already been given:
supra, page 410.

As the police power belonged to the States before the adoption
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,of the Constitution, and was not taken away from them by that
instrument, its existence has been constantly recognized by
the Courts: HARLAN, J., Patterson v. Ky. (878), 7 Otto (97
U. S.) 501, 503, and citations; FULLER, C. J., and GRAY, J., in
the Or'ginalPackage Case,infra.
Commenting upon this reservation of power, Chief Justice
Parker, of New Hampshire, observed in one of the License
CasesIt is very clear that the power of regulating the internal trade, and matters of police of the several States, is not granted to the United States, nor
prohibited to the States. As a general rule, it is undeniable that each
State may manage affairs of that description as fully as it might do before
the Government of the United States was formed, except in cases where
there is an express prohibition in the Constitution; and if the right to
pass laws which regard the prevention of crime, pauperism, and misery,
.and the promotion of the health and happiness of the citizens, by imposing restraints upon the sale, and upon the exclusive use of the means of
intoxication (which has been supposed to be a very important branch of
police), is taken away by the Constitution, it must be by some grant of
power to the general government inconsistent with further -legislation of
that description by the several States. And if they are thus deprived of it
by implication, it is lost entirely ; for there is no grant of power in the
-Constitutionwhich will enable the Government of the United States to ex.ercise any such authority. There is no express or implied grant by which
that government can regulate the internal trade of the States in relation
to this, or any other article.' It has never attempted any such thing: (13
N. H. 572-3.)

The power of Congress to recognize State laws, and to permit their operation, is considered later in these pages, under the
recent Act of Congress relative to the liquor traffic.
Omitted Subjects.
The limited space at command for the examination of so
important and extensive a subject, requires a somewhat close
.adherence to the subject announced in the title of this article;
so that the omission is necessarily made of an examination
into the legal effect of the embargo acts, tariff laws, the constitutional restraint in Art. I,§ 9, cl. I, (further than it is alluded
in the Passenger Cases, infra), and similar subjects.
IV.

Commerce is a unit comprehending every species of commerxial intercourse,as well as traffic.
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The Regudation of Commerce is effected by prescribing rides
for carrying on commercial intercourse.
The power to regulate Commerce, extends into the jurisdiction
of the States, until each instance of commercial intercourse witt
foreirz nations and among the States has terminated.
The power of Congress to regudate commerce includes the
control of navigation.
A coasting license under the laws of the United States, nulliYies a State law requiring a State license for the use of stean ta
propel a vessel within a harbor of the State.
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.) I, came up from

the Court of Errors of New York, where a decree had been
made in January, 1820 (17 Johns. N. Y. 488, 5 io), unanimously
affirming the decretal order of Chancellor KENT, made October
6, 18r9 (4 Johns. Chan. I5o), whereby the State courts affirmed

the validity of grants made by the legislature of New York to
Livingston and Fulton, for the exclusive right to navigate
steamboats in the waters of that State, for a limited period,
with penalty of forfeiture of any steamboat not run under license from these grantees of the upposed powers of the State.
Ogden claimed under Livingston and Fulton, and on the filing
ofhisbill, Chancellor KENT, October 21, i8i8, granted an
injunction. This injunction was continued, on a motion to dissolve, made after Gibbons, the defendant, had filed his answer,
in which he set up, (I) that he had a license to carry on the
coasting trade under the laws of the United States, and (2) that
he had a license under the representatives of Livingston and
Fulton. The second ground of defense was futile, in view of
its averments, and fell out of the case. The case therefore
progressed through all the courts with a speed no greater than
at present, upon the one point of the conflict between the grant
by the State and the license for coasting trade by the National government. The constitutionality of the grants was not
raised, as that had already been settled in the Court of Errors
of New York, in Livingston v. Pan Ingen (1812), 9 Johns. 507,
where Chancellor Lansing had refused an injunction sustaining the grant, on the ground of the doubts which troubled him
in construing the Commerce clause (Art. I. sec. 8) and the
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'Equal Rights clause (Art. IV. sec. 2), of the Constitution of the
United States. On appeal, the refusal of the injunction was
reversed, upon the two grounds, (I) that neither the powers of
Congress over patents was exclusive of the power of the State
to encourage the introduction of novelties by exclusive grants,
nor (2) thatthe regulation of commerce had been interfered with.
As the second point eventually reached the Supreme Court of
the United States, the first need not be considered here. Upon
the second point, YATES, J., expressed himself thus :It never could have been intended that the navigable waters within the
-territory of the respective States, should not be subject to this municipal
regulation. Such a construction might, with equal propriety, be applied
to turnpike roads, ferries, bridges and various other local objects, and thus,
in the vortex of this construction, almost all subjects of legislation would
be swallowed up, and it might eventually lead to the total prostration of
internal improvements. To all municipal regulations, therefore, in relation to the navigable waters of the State, according to the true construction of the Constitution, to which the citizens of this State are subject, the
citizens of other States, when within the State territory, are equally subjected: and until a discrimination is made, no constitutional barrier does
exist. The Constitution of the United States intends that the same immunities and privileges shall be extended to all citizens equally, for the
-wise purpose of preventing local jealousies, which discriminations (always deemed odious) might otherwise produce. As this Constitution,
then, according to my view, does not prevent the operation of those laws
granting this exclusive privilege to the appellants, they are entitled to the
full benefit of them: (9Johnson 561.)

Kent was also one of the judges and delivered a separate
opinion upon the constitutionality of the acts of the legislature
of New York. Some extracts will be interesting when read in
connection with his explanations in 1827, three years after the
Supreme Court of the United States had reversed all these
decisions.The law concerning the coasting trade was passed on the iSth of February, 1793 - and it never occurred to any one during the whole period that
the State laws were under consideration before the legislature, and in the
council of revision, and in the courts of justice, from 1798 down to and
including the judicial investigations in 1812, that the Coasting Act of 1793
was a regulation of commerce among the States, prohibitory of any such
grant. Such latent powers were never thought of, nor imputed to it : (i
Comm. 435-)

Returning to the opinion delivered in
anents were expressed by KENT-

1812,

these senti-
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There is no obvious'constitutional objection, or it would not so repeatedly
have escaped the notice of the several branches of the [State] government,
when these acts were under consideration. The act [passed] in the year
1798 was particularly calculated to awaken attention, as it was the first act
that was passed upon the subject, after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, and it would naturally lead to a consideration of the power of
a State to make such a grant. * * * There were members in that legislature, as well as in all the other departments of the [State] government,
who had been deeply concerned in the study of the Constitution of the
United States, and who were the masters of all' the critical discussions
which had attended the interesting progress of its adoption. Several of
them had been members of the State convention, and this -wasparticularly
the case with the exalted character, who at that time was chiefimagistrate
of the State (JOHN JAY; also Chief Justice ofthe United States from 1789 to.
1794), and who was distinguished as well in the Council of Revision, as.
elsewhere, for the scrupulous care and profound attention with which he
examined every question of a constitutional nature: (9 Johns. 573.)
We are not called upon to say affirmatively, what powers have been
granted to the general government, or to what extent. These powers,
whether express or implied, may be plenary and sovereign, in reference
to the specified objects of them.
They'may even be liberally construed in furtherance of the great andessential ends of the government. To this doctrine. I willingly accede.
But the question here is, not what powers are granted to that government,
but what powers are retained by this, and particularly, whether the States
have absolutely parted with their original power of granting such an exclusive privilege as the one now before us. * ** * Our safe rule of
construction, and of action, is this, that if any given power was originally
vested in this State, if it has not been exclusively ceded to Congress, or if
the exercise of it has not been prohibited to the States, we [the State
government] may then go on in the exercise of this power until it comes
practically in collision with the actual exercise of some congressional
power. When that happens to be the case, the State authority will so far
be controlled, but it will still be good in all those respects in which it does
not absolutely contravene the provision of the paramount law. (Id. 574,576).

Dismissing the equal rights clause of the Constitution (Art.
IV. sec 2) as having nothing to do with the case, KENT proceeded to point out that the commerce clause (Art. I. sec. 8,
cl. 3) was not, in terms, exclusive, and consequently suffered
the States to exercise their sovereignty over internal commerce by land and water, while Congress regulated external
commerce. While the exact limits of the power of Congress
might be difficult to define, it seemed an inadmissible proposition that the exclusive grant in question had been placed beyond the power of the State, because Congress might enact a.
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conflicting law. As shown by the citation from his Commentaries, neither KENT norany other lawyer or judge had thought
at that time of the existing Act of 1793. And this is readily
understood by another quotation from the same opinion:Congress, indeed, has not any direct jurisdiction over our interior commerce, or waters. [The] Hudson river is the property of the people of
this State, and the legislature have the same jurisdiction over it that they
have over the land, or over any of our public highways, or over the waters
of any of our rivers or lakes. They may, in their sound discretion, regulate and control, enlarge or abridge, the use of its waters, and they are in
the habitual exercise of that sovereign right. If the Constitution had
given to Congress exclusive jurisdiction over our navigable waters, then
the argument of the respondents would have applied; but the people
never did, nor ever intended, to grant such a power; and Congress have
concurrent jurisdiction over the navigable waters no further than may be
incidental and requisite to the due regulation of commerce between the
States, and with foreign nations: (9 Johns. N. Y. 579.)

Returning to the case as finally presented to KENT, after he
became Chancellor, he dismissed the newly supposed conflict,
between the legislature thus sustained and the National coasting license law, with the terse remark, thatIf the State laws were not absolutely null and void from the beginning,
they require a greater power than a simple Coasting license, to disarm
them: (4Johns. Chan. 156, 158, 159.)

Before the injunction order in the last case had been affirmed on appeal, Gibbons undertook to set up a circuitous route
between Elizabeth and New York, by way of the Quarantine;
with the result of the defendant and his steamboat captain,
Vanderbilt, almost suffering the penalties of an attachment.
It would seem that the appeal to the Court of Errors was
merely a formal step towards the Supreme Court of the United
States (17 Johns. N. Y. 505) though the right of the legislature to make such a grant was again questioned and briefly affirmed by the Court. The argument based upon the coasting
license was briefly considered and also denied, PLATT, J., sayingThe term " license" seems not to be used in the sense imputed to it
by the counsel for the appellant; that is, a permit to trade; or as giving a
right of transit. Because it is perfectly clear, that such a vessel, coasting
from one State to another, would have exactly the same right to trade,
and the same right of transit, whether she had a coasting license or not.
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She does not, therefore, derive her right from the license; the only effect
of which is, to determine her national character and the rate of duties
which she is to pay. ** * Whether Congress has the power to authorize the coasting trade to be carried on in vessels propelled by steam, so as
to give a paramount right in opposition to the special license given by
this State, is a question not yet presented to us. No such act of Congress
yet exists, and it will be time enough to discuss that question when it
arises: (17 Johns. 509.)

When Mr. Webster came to argue the case in the Supreme
Court of the United States, he made a strong point of the conflict which had already arisen; in retaliation to the laws .of
New York, Connecticut had forbidden any steam vessel having
a license under the laws of New York from entering her
waters, while New Jersey gave to any one of her citizens who
should be restrained by the laws of New York, an action for
damages and treble costs against the party who invoked the
law of New York. This was the serious danger before the
Court, to be averted by reversing, or perpetuated by affirming,
the injunction ordered by Chancellor Kent.
Again, he urged that the present government came into being only or chiefly at least, because of the necessity for a steady
and uniform commercial system. This part of his. argument
was adorned with many historical references; and concluded
by urging that the power of Congress was exclusive, so that
what was not legislated upon, was thus regulated in the negative.
This is now the view of the Supreme Court (I Kent Comm.
*438). In those days MARSHALL preferred to decide no more
than the cases before the Court called for, although the principles upon which his decisions proceeded furnished the foundation for the affirmance of Webster's contention long after
both the Chief Justice and the great Lawyer had passed away.
On the other side, the counsel contended, as a result of many
authorities, that the power contained in the Commerce clause,
was at best, a concurrent one; the argument following the lines
already indicated in the opinions of the New York Courts.
The Supreme Court of the United States was at this time
(1824) composed of Chief Justice MARSHALL, who wrote the
opinion of the Court, and Justices WASHINGTON, TODD, DuVALL,
STORY, and JOHNSON (who also wrote a concurring opinion).
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The Chief Justice began his opinion with words worthy of
remembrance The State of New York maintains the constitutionality of these laws;
and their legislature, their Council of Revision. and their judges, have
repeatedly concurred in this opinion. It is supported by great namesby names which have all the titles to consideration which virtue, intelligence and office can bestow. No tribunal can approach the decision of
this question without feeling a just and real respect for that opinion which
is sustained by such authority; but it is the province of this Court, while it
respects, not to bow to it implicitly ; and the judges must exercise, in the
examination of the subject, that understanding which Providence has bestowed upon them, with that independence which the people of the United
-States expect from this department of the government.

Coming then to the question before the Court, the Chief
Justice first laid down that the "Commerce," which Congress
had power to regulate, was a unit, comprehending every species
of commercial intercourse.
Justice JOHNSON wrote a separate opinion under the impression that his entire approbation of the judgment was founded
on materially different views; yet his definition was substantially the same, and worthy of repetition as approaching the
subject from the same direction as taken by TANEY and the
other dissenting Justices in the PassengerCases, infra.
Commerce, in its simplest signification, means an exchange of goods:
but in the advancement of society, labor, transportation, intelligence,
care, and various mediums, of exchange, become commodities, and enter
into commerce; the subject, the vehicle, the agent, and their various
operations, become the obipcts of commercial regulation. Ship-building,
the carrying trade, and propagation of seamen, are such vital agents of
commercial prosperity, that the nation which could not legislate over
these subjects, would not possess the power to regulate commerce: JOHNsoN, j. Gibbonsv. Ogden (1824), 9 Wheat, (22 U. S.) 229-30.

The definition of "Commerce" contained in MARSHALL'S
opinion, has been often referred to; thus STORY, dissenting in
the Miln Case (I I Peters, 36 U. S. 154-5), cites these sen-

tences
Commerce undoubtedly is traffic; but it is something more. It is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations and
1parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules
for carrying on that intercourse: (9 Wheat, 22 U. S. 189.)
No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any other,
-towhich this power does not extend. * ** * But, in regulating comVOL. XXXVIII.-28
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merce with foreign nations, the powver of Congress does not stop at the
jurisdictionallines of the several States. It would be a very useless power
if it couldnot pass those lines. * * * If Congress has the power to regulate
it, that power must be exercised wherever the subject exists. If it exists
within the States, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a
port within a State, then the power of Congress may be exercised within a
State: (Id. 193, 195.)

The Chief Justice repeated and affirmed this definition in
Brown v. Maryland,and would have done so in the Miln case
(as Justice STORY asserts in his dissenting opinion in that
case), if he had lived until a decision upon the reargument
could have been agreed to.
The special kind of tommercial intercourse involved in the
case of Gibbons v. Ogden, was navigation, and the Court was.
urged to exclude it, by limiting the definition of commerce so>
that it should include only what was understood by traffic;
that is, buying and selling and the interchange of commodities.
This was refused, the Chief Justice using this languageThe mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, whick
shall be silent on the Admission of the vessels of the one nation into the
ports of another, and be confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of"
individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter.
If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union
has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing
what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen. Yet this power has been exercised from the
commencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent
of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All
America understands, and has uniformly understood the word "commerce,"
to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so
understood, when the Constitution was framed. The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the
people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it. The convention must have used the word in that
sense, because all have understood it in that sense; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late: (9 Wheat. 22 U. S. 19o.)

Not trusting entirely to so complete a common sense
demonstration, the Chief Justice also found additional confirmmation in that section of the Constitution (sufpra, page 424)
which requires Congress to deal equally with the commerce
of the different States.
The opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, proceeded, second, that
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the force of the word "Among," meaning interminglea with,
.was such that it could not stop at State lines, though not comprehending completely internal commerce of a single State,
and this asThe phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt
phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of
commerce to which the power was to be extended, would not have been
made, had the intention been to extend the power to every description.
The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be
the exclusively internal commerce of a State. The genius and character
of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all
the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which
affect the States generally ; but not to those which are completely within
a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is
not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely internal commerce of a
State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself: (Id. 195.)

This distinction between the powers of-the State and of the
Nation, drew' from Justice BALDWIN, in his opinion in the
Miln case, the thought that nothing could be in more perfect
conformity with the spirit and words of the Constitution:
(Bald. Views, 188-9.) So also THOMPSON, J., dissenting inBrown v. Maryland (1827), i2 Wheat. (25 U. S.) 452.
The Chief Justice proceeded to the case in handWhat is commerce "among" them; and how is it to be conducted?
Can a trading expedition between two adjoining States commence and
terminate outside of each? And if the trading intercourse be between two.
States remote from each other, must it commence in one, terminate in
the other, and probably pass through a third? Commerce among the
States must, of necessity, be commerce with the States. In the regulation of trade with the Indian tribes, the action of the law, especiallywhen
the Constitution was made, was chiefly within a State. The power of'
Congress, then, whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States: (Id. 196.)
Turning again to the principles decided by this great case,
a consequence ensued from those already noticed, that, third,
the power was one for regulation, without limit other than the
Constitution prescribes; fourth, that the question of the power
of a State to legislate in the absence of any Congressional action, was not decided, as Congress had already acted in pass-
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ing the navigation laws, and this remained for further consideration ; fifth, that the important question really was whether,
Congress and the States could regulate interstate commerce at
the same time.
Noticing and approving Mr. Webster's argument for the
exclusive power of Congress, the Chief Justice yet did not go
so far as to rest the opinion of the Court .upon that ground,
but rather upon the practical side of the whole case, namely,
the conflict between the two laws.
Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether those laws
-were passed in virtue of a concurrent power "to regulate commerce with
-foreign nations and among the several States," or in virtue of a power to
Tegulate their domestic trade and police. In one case and the other, the
acts of New York must yield to the law of Congress; the decision sustaining the privilege they confer, against a right given by a law of the Union,
"mustbe erroneous: (p. 210.)

After an examination of the license given to a coaster, the
Chief Justice had little, difficulty in deciding that the license
really did what it purported to do; that is, give permission to
carry on a coasting trade; and this without regard to the
motive power of the vessel. Hence the State laws which inhibited the use of steam as a means of propulsion, came into
direct collision with both the general coasting license and that
granted to steamboats, and was void. The injunction was dissolved and the State Court directed to dismiss the bill filed for
relief.
In eliminating those elements of the opinion which do not
necessarily support the judgment entered, there is no intention to slight the points which occupy fully one-third of the
opinion, and which were discussed as affording light from the
context of the Constitution. In these pages they are taken
-up in connection with their appropriate cases, and it is merely
-necessary to anticipate here the statement of their natural result, that the power of Congress to refrain, as well as to act,
is exclusive of any State action. Justice JOHNSON dissented
solely because the judgment of the Court was not placed upon
this larger ground, so that there is here shown the curious,
though satisfactory result of a dissenting opinion becoming the
law of the land without overruling the principles of the judgment actually entered.
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Affirming this position as well as the similar sentiments of
Justice GRIER in the PassengerCases, (1849) 7 How. (48 U. S.)
283,462, Justice BRADLEY, in Walling v. Micldgan (I886), 116
U. S. 446,456, called attention to the modifications subsequently
established in Cooley v. Port Wardens, infra, and other decisions, and pointed out that the complete doctrine, as stated
above on page 420, was well summarized by Justice FIELD, in
M~obile v. Kimball, infra.
The effect of the license was the actual point decided: Per
BARBOUR, J., The Mayor, etc., v. .17511 (1837), II Peters (36
U. S.) 134; CATRON, J., License Cases (847), 5 How. (46
U. S.) 504, 602; GRAY, J., dissenting in the OriginalPackage
Case, infra: that is, that the grant of power in the Constitution, accompanied by Congressional legislation under it,
operated as an inhibition upon the State as respects the subject
legislated upon: FIELD, J., Mobile Co. v. Kmball (I 88o), 102
U. S., 691, 699; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa. (1885), 114 Id.,
196, 211.
All Judges agree in considering this a great and leading
case on the subject of foreign and interstate commerce but
not alone from the point decided. The principles, and even
the dicta of the great Chief Justice have become parts of the
constitutional principles of the country, quite as much as the
written words of the Constitution itself; and in this aspect,
the objections of advocates of the fullest local power possible,
are worthy of more consideration than the approbation of
men of like mind with MARSHALL and his associate Justices.
What errors have been successfully pointed out ?
Reversing the course of time, and taking the dissenting
opinion in the Original Package Case first, Justice GRAY there
points out the restraint put upon the principles of this case by
MARSHALL himself in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,
infra; similarly Justice CATRON, License Cases (1847), 5 How.
(46 U. S.) 504, 6o5; Chief Justice TANEY, Id. 583, and dissenting in Pa. v. Wheeling Bridge Co. (1851), 13 How. (54 U. S.)
518, 586-7.

The Granger cases (1877), 4 Otto (94 U. S.) 155, 183, do
not notice Gibbons v. Ogden, and cannot be considered as affecting its principles; but the general subject of rates even for
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interstate transportation forms so large a division of the law
and one so separable that it is omitted here for want of space.
It has been supposed that Gibbons v. Ogden was distinguished in 2ftiorgan v. Parhan(872), 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 471, 475,
but the same fundamental principle was applied in each case,
and the only countenance to such an idea arises from the difference in the facts; the great case denying that interstate
commerce could be compelled to obtain a State license, and
the later equally denying the right of a State to tax a coaster
away from her home port.
So far as The Genesee Clzief (1857), 12 How. (53 U. S.) 452,
,established the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States
Courts upon the navigability of the water, and not the commerce borne upon the water, there is no conflict with Gibbons
v. Ogden, for the cases relate to entirely distinct matters.
Chief Justice TANEY and Justice CATRON, in the License
Cases,infra,attempted to limit the power of Congress, so that
it should not prevent State action, by an exclusive construction,
the former asserting (5 How. 581), that the doctrine of the
exclusive power of Congress was not seriously put forward
until after the decision in "Gibbonsv. Ogden. So far as this attempt entered into the law declared in the License Cases,it will
appear in the review of those cases, to have failed long before
Chief Justice FULLER came to write the opinion of the Court
in the OriginalPackage Case.
The Miln case, infra, was a serious attempt to undermine the
authority of Gibbons v. Ogden, and the disagreement amongst
the Justices is not nearly so apparent in the report, as in the
opinions of Justice WAYNE and Chief Justice TANEY in the
Passenger Cases, infrq. It is unnecessary to anticipate further
than that the attempt resulted in the principles first positively
formulated in Cooley v. Port Wardens, infra, and now affirmed
in the early part of the opinion in the OriginalPackage Case,
,without any dissent; namely, that the power to regulate commerce among the States, is a unit, but if particular subjects
within its operation do not require the application of a general
or uniform system, the States may legislate in regard to them
with a view to local needs and circumstances, until Congress
otherwise directs.
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Congress has exclusive power over the importation of foreigz
inerchandise,and no State can require the payment of a tax, or
license, before the sale by the importer,in the orzginal package.
Foreigngoods are imported by merchants for sale and their
sales cannot be restrictedfurther than their importationsmay be.
Imported merchandise, upon which the duties have been paid,
is not subject to State taxation while in the possession of the importer and in the originalpackages, though offered for sale.
When an original package has been used or exchangcd by
breakingup for use or retail sale, and also when it has been sold
--by the importer in its orginal condition, it loses its distinctive
characterof an import and becomes subject to the powers of the
State.
A tax upon the dealeris, in effect, a tax upon the goods them.selves.
Brown etal. v. The State ofMaryland(i 827), 12 Wheat. (25 U.
S.) 419,came up from the Court of Appeals of Maryland, where a
judgment of the City Court of Baltimore, upon a demurrer to
an indictment, had been affirmed, and the present plaintiffs in
error condemned for not taking out a license as importers of
foreign articles. They denied that the State could require such a license as the right to collect fifty dollars was a
right which would authorize any sum as the license fee;*that
is, the power to lay such a tax was a power to destroy or prohibit, which had been declared outside of the present powers of
the States in McCulloc&v. Maryland(1819), 4 Wheat. (I 7 U.
S.) 316.
The indictment had been founded upon an Act of the legislature of Maryland, passed in 1821, entitledAn Act supplementary to the Act laying Duties on Licenses to Retailers

of Dry Goods, and for other purposes.
SEcTIoN 2. And be it enacted, that all importers of foreign articles or
commodities of dry goods, wares, or merchandise, by bale or package, or
of wine, rum, brandy, whisky and other distilled spirituous liquors, etc.,
and other persons selling the same by wholesale, bale, or package, hogshead, barrel or tierce, shall, before they are authorized to sell, take out a
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license, as by the original act is directed, for which they shall pay -fifty
dollars ; and in case of neglect or refusal to take out such license, shall be
subject to the same penalties and forfeitures asare prescribed by the original act to which this is a supplement.

Under this Act, Chief Justice Marshall considered the question for solution was a single one with two aspects arising from
two separate clauses of the Constitution, the Eighth and Tenth
Sections of the First Article.
The cause depends entirely on the question, whether the legislature of
a State can constitutionally require an importer of foreign articles to take
out a license from the State, before he shall be permitted to sell a bale or
package so imported: (12 Wheat. 25 U. S. 436.)

That this was the precise point for decision was observed
by Justice BARBOUR in delivering the opinion of the Court in
The 11fayor, etc., v. .Viln (1837), 11 Peters (36 U. S.) i34; and
by Chief Justice TANEY in the License Cases (1847), 5 How.
(46 U. S.) 575, where he gave his adhesion to the doctrine
denying such power to the State. He had been counsel for
the State of Maryland in the Brown case, and he now thought
the rule was a safe and just one, and most in harmony with
the obvious intention of the Constitution.
Attention is called to this statement of the point decided,
because there have been those who have considered this case
to have been overruled by Woodriff v. Parham(I868), infra,
where a tax upon all auction.sales in the city of Mobile was
sustained although some of the goods sold were from another
State. The tax was sustained because there was no attempt
to discriminate; it was imposed upon all sales and all persons
making auction sales.
Under the Tenth Section of the First Article of the Constitution (ante, page 425), the Chief Justice coincided with the
argument urged against the StateWhether the prohibition to "lay imports, or duties on imports or exports," proceeded from an apprehension that the power might be so exercised as to disturb that equality among the States which was generally
advantageous, or that harmony between them, which it was desirable to
preserve, or to maintain unimpaired our commercial connections with
foreign nations, or to confer this source of revenue on the government of
the Union, or whatever other motive might have induced the prohibition,
it is plain that the object would be as completely defeated by a power to
tax the article in the hands of the importer, the instant it was landed, as.
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by a power to tax it -while entering port. There is no difference between
a power to prohibit the sale of an article, and a power to prohibit its introduction into the country. The one would be a necessary consequence of
the other. No goods would be imported if none could be sold. No object of any description can be accomplished by laying a duty on importation, which may not be accomplished with equal certainty by laying a
duty on the thing imported in the hands of the importer. It is obvious
that the same power which imposes a light duty, can impose avery heavy
one, one which amounts to a prohibition. Questions of power do not depend upon the degree to which it may be exercised: (12 Wheat. 25 U. S.
439-)

This position did noi command entire assent, though it was
strong enough to induce the Supreme Court of New Hampshire to avoid it with the remarkIf the sale be prohibited, it may, notwithstanding, be introduced for use
by the person importing, for export to another country, or for the purpose
of being sent to another State and sold there, if a sale there be lawful:
PARKER, C. J., Piercev. The State (1843), 17 N. H. 586.

Of course, the law is now declared otherwise, in conformity
with the sentiments of MARSHALL. See the decisions and citations in the opinion in The OriginalPackage Case, infra.
Coming nearer to the precise case before the Court, it was
argued that the tax demanded was upon the person, and not
on the traffic. To this MARSHALL answeredIt is impossible to conceal from ourselves, that this is varying the form,
without varying the substance. It is treating a prohibition which is general, as if it were confined to a particular mode of doing the forbidden
thing. All must perceive that a tax on the sale of an article, imported
only for sale, is a tax on the article itself. It is true, the State may tax
occupations generally, but this tax must be paid by those who employ
the individual, or is a tax on his business. The lawyer, the physician,
or the mechanic, must either charge more on the article in whichhedeals,
or the thing itself is taxed through his person. This the State has a right
to do, because no constitutional prohibition extends to it. So, a tax on
the occupation of an importer is, in like manner, a tax on importation.
It must add to the price of the article, and be paid by the consumer, or by
the importer himself, in like manner as a direct duty on the article itself
would be made. This the State has not a right to do, because it is prohibited by the Constitution: (Id. 444.)

In the other aspect of the case, under the Eighth Section of
the Commerce clause of the First Article of the Constitution,
there was an affirmance of the general principle laid down in
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"Gibbons'v. Ogden (supra,page 432), where the extent of the
-powerto regulate commerce among the several States, was declared to -be without limitations other than those placed upon
.-it.by the Constitution. In the language of MARSHALLThe power is co-extensive with the subject upon which it acts and can:.not be stopped at the external boundary of the State, but must enterits interior * ** * * * * If this power reaches the interior of the State, and,
may -therebe exercised, it must be capable of authorizing the sale of those
:articles which it introduces. Commerce is intercourse; one of its most
-ordinary ingredients is traffic * * * ** Sale is the object of importation,
.and is aa essential ingredient of that intercourse of which importation
constitutes a part. It is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable to the
,existence of the entire thing, then, as the importation itself. It must be
-considered a component part of the power to regulate commerce. dongress
hasa right, not only to authorize importation, but to authorize the imorter to sell * ** * * The power claimed by the State is, in its nature,
.in conflict with that given to Congress ; and the greater or less extent in
-which it may be exercised, does not enter into the enquiry concerning its
4existence ** * Any charge on the introduction and incorporation of
the articles intoand with the mass of property in the country, must be
,hostile to the power given to Congress to regulate commerce, since an
essential part of that regulation, and the principal object of it, is to prescribe the regular means for accomplishing that introduction and incorporation : (12 Wheat. 25 U. S. 446-8.)

In this case, the rule in Gibbons v. Ogden, ante, page 426,
received a necessary limitation, to prevent the abridgment of
the power of taxation by the State'It may be conceded that the words of the prohibition ought not to be
pressedto their utmost extent; that in our complex system, the object of
powers conferred on the government of the Union, and the nature of the
often conflicting powers which renmain in the States, must always be
taken .into view, and may aid in expounding the words of any particular
-clause. But, while we admit that sound principles of construction ought
to restrain all courts from carrying the words of the prohibition beyond
the object the Constitution is intended to secure, that there must be a
point oftime when the prohibition ceases, and the power of the State to
-taxcommences; we -annot admit that this point of time is the instant
-that thearticles :enter the country. It is, we think, obvious, that this con:struction would defeat the prohibition: (12 Wheat. 25 U. S. 441.)

Realizing that this prohibition upon State taxation might be
so construed as to deprive the State of its rightful powers, the
language alreadyquoted on page 44o sutpra, was followed by
a definition which embraced the now well-known term used as
a part of the title of these pages.
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The power [of the State to ta ] and the [Constitutional] restriction upon
it, though quite distinguishable when they do not approach each other,
may yet, like intervening colors between black and white, approach so
nearly as to perplex the understanding, as colors perplex the vision in
marking the distinction between them. Yet the distinction ex-ists, and
must be marked as the cases arise. Till they do arise, it might be premature to state any rule as being universal in its application. It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the importer has so
acted upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and mixed
up with the mass of property in the country, ithas, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing
power of the State, but while remaining the property of the importer, in
his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported,
a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports, to escape the prohibition in
the Constitution: (Id. 441-2.)

The precise case here supposed arose in California (Low v.
Alustin, 1872, 13 Wall. 80 U. S. 29), where an attempt to asses§ imported wines for local taxation was sustained by the
State Supreme Court, but that judgment was reversed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, Justice FIELD delivering
the opinion. The duty had been paid on these wines, and the
importer then stored them in the original packages awaiting a
sale. The California Judges (TEMPLE, WALLACE, CROCKETT
and SPRAGUE), thought this case did not rest upon the same
principle as Brown v. Maryland,In this case, no tax is levied upon imports ; as such, they are not subjected to any burden as a class, and we did not understand the case of Brown
v. Marylandas going to the extent of establishing that an ad valorem
tax by the State, upon the property of its citizens, would be in conflict
with this provision, even though a portion of such values were invested
in imported goods still in the original packages and unsold. We see no
reason why imported goods exposed in the store of a merchant for sale,
do not constitute a portion of the wealth of the State, as much as domestic
goods similarly situated. A tax which is imposed upon all the property
of the State cannot in any sense be considered a tax upon commerce. It
has no tendency to discourage importations. * * The tax prohibited
must be a tax upon the character of the goods as importations, rather
than upon the goods themselves as property.

The Attorney General of the State illustrated the argument
that the State could tax, by asserting that this wine was
placed where thieves might break through and steal, but for
the local police force.
-But the obvious answer to this position is found in the fact, which is, in
substance, expressed in the citations made from the opinions of IARSHALT.
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and TAEV'x,that the goods imported do not lose their character as imports,
and become incorporated into the mass of property of the State, untiltheyhave passed from the control of the importer, or been broken up by him
from their original cases. Whilst retaining their character as imports, a tax
upon them, in any shape, is within the constitutional prohibition : F~gxE.D,
J., Low v. Austit (1872), 13 Wall. (8o U. S.) 29, 34.

This idea seems to have had some local prevalence, as it is
combatted, though without reference to this denial, by DEADY,
D. J., in U. S. v. Bridelmnan (i88I), U. S. Dist. Ct., Dist. Ore.,
7 Fed. Repr. 894,901.
Afterwards, the case of an export arose by an attempt to
tax logs purchased for export and at the place of export, waiting shipment to a foreign country. The tax was declared invalid, on the authority of Brown v. M7faryland and Low v.
Austin, by WOODS, Circ. J., Clarke & Co. v. Clarke (1877), U.
S. Circ. Ct., S. Dist. Ga., 3 Woods 4o8.
The same judges concurred in Brown v. .17faryland as in
Gibbons v. Ogden, page 432, but Justice THomPsoN dissented, on
the ground that nothing more was required by the Maryland
law than that retail and wholesale dealers in foreign merchandise must take out a license for authority to sell; that this license in the case of retail dealers was thought to be no violation of the Constitution; that the wholesale dealer was such
in the internal commerce of the State only; that he had been
indicted for selling without a license and not for importing;
and that there would be no doubt a violation of the Constitution if the State law had required a license to import. The
Court was thus unanimous on the subject of importation and
the great majority thought importation included the right to
sell in the original package. The dissenting judge though
that the imports were not even protected by stopping at the
line of the original package, as the moment it was broken, the
State laws would apply and effectually serve to restrain imports; not being willing to go to that extreme, Justice THOMPSON dissented.
The Miln case (infra) necessarily involved the principles of
this case, when it raised the question of the correctness of the
principles of Gibbons v. Ogden; it is not necessary to anticipate.
as the final result has been a complete affirmance.
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State laws affecting commerce are valid in the absence of
Congressionallegislation,and in the case of a subject not requiring a general regulation.
Such a subject is a dam or bridge interfering with commerce
in a stream wholly within a State thoughflowing into an interstate body of water.
Suck laws are the exercise of the reservedpolice powers of the
State.
The case of Thompson Wilson, et al., v. The Black Bird Creek
liarsh Company (1829), 2 Peters (27 U. S.) 245, arose from
the erection of a dam across a small salt water creek in the
State of Delaware, under the authority of the State law passed
in February 1822. The owers of a sloop called the Sally,
broke down the dam which had been erected, and defended
their action under the Commerce clause of the Constitution.
This was denied by Chief Justice MARSHALL in delivering the
opinion, on the ground that Congress had not acted, and in
the absence of such action, the neighboring meadows might
be kept dry and the health of the community improved by
such schemes, *eventhough the tide had flowed above where
the dam was erected; the language of the opinion on this
point was:
If Congress had passed any act which bore upon the case; any act in
execution of the power to regulate commerce, the object of which was to
control State legislation over these small, navigable creeks into which the
tide flows and which abound throughout the lower country of the Middle
and Southern States, we should feel not much difficulty in'saying that a
State law coming in conflict with such act, would be void. The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the Constitution,is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States; a power which has not been so exercised as to
affect the question:

(2 Peters, 27 U. S. 252.)

This case was distinctly affirmed in the Chestnut Street
Bridge Case, (Gilman v. Phla. 1866, 3 Wall. 70 U. S. 713,
727-9) on an opinion by Justice SwAYNE, with the concurrence of Justice CHASE, and Justices GRIER, NELSON,
MILLER and FIELD, the dissent being by Justices CLIFFORD,
WAYNE and DAVID DAVIS; and again affirmed in Pound
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v. Turck (1878), 5 Otto (95 U. S.) 459, in an opinion,
by Justice MILLER, with the concurrence of Chief Justice
WAITE and Justices STRONG, HUNT, SWAYNE, FIELD, BRADLEY
and HARLAN, Justice CLIFFORD also concurring, though still

adhering to the principles of his dissenting opinion in Gilman
v. Pi/ia. It is used by Justice STRONG, in Transportation Co.
v. Chicago (1879), 99 U. S. 635, 643, with the assent of all the
last mentioned Justices, except HUNT (who was absent); by
Justice FIELD, in Cardwell v. Bridge Co. (1884), 113 U. S.
205, 209, with the assent of Justices MILLER, BRADLEY, HARLAN, WOODS, MATTHEWS, GRAY and BLATCHFORD, Chief Justice WAITE being absent; and by Justices GRAY, HARLAN and
BREWER, in their dissent in the OriginalPackage Case, infra.

It is therefore important to observe that this quotation from
MARSHALL'S opinionhas been supposed to demonstrate that he
did not hold to the exclusive view of the power of Congress.
which has subsequently been deduced from his language in the
preceding cases. If such inference should be correct, then the
Chief Justice should be classed with KENT and those who.
hold that the State may legislate until Congress acts. See
pages 421, 430, 43 1, supra.
This understanding of MARSHALL'S views was held by Chief
Justice TANEY and Justices WOODBURY and CATRON, in the

License Cases, 5 How. (46 U. S.) 583, 605, 625, although the
latter recognized the conflicting statements of two contemporaneous Justices, THOMPSON and STORY, in the Miln Case,
infra. TANEY repeated this sentiment in his dissent in the
Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. (54 U. S.) 518, 585.
Justice DANIEL was on the bench when the License Cases
were decided, but made no allusion to this case until the Passenger Cases came before the court, when he, too, joined in
holding thatThe case of Wilson v. Tke Blackbird Creek Afarsk Company affirms,
in language too explicit for misapprehension, that the States may,
by their legislation, create what may be obstructions of the means of commercial intercourse, subject to the controlling and paramount authority ofCongress :"

(7 How. 48 U. S. 500.)

And similarly, when dissenting in the Wheeling Bridge Case,
13 How. (54 U. S.) 518, 599. And the dissent of Chief Jus-
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tice WAITE and Justices HARLAN and GRAY, in Bowman v.
Chzicago & N. W. RR. Co. (1888), 125 U. S.521-2. Naturally,
therefore, the survivors (GRAY and HARLAN) dissent in the
Original Package Case, infra, where their views are stated at
length. Still, Chief Justice WAITE, eleven years previous, had
explained thatThere can be no doubt but that exclusive power has been conferred upon Congress in respect to the regulation of commerce among the several
States. The difficulty has never been as to the existence of this power,
but as to what is to be deemed an encroachment upon it: Hall v. DeCuir (1877), 5 Otto (95 U. S.) 485, 488.

Chief Justice WAITE also argued with Justice BRADLEY (one
of the majority of the Court in the Original Package Case,
(in/ra),and with Justice GRAY in dissenting from the opinion
of the Court in Wabash, St. L. & P. .RR. Co. v. Zllinois(1886), ii8 U. S. 557, where the State was denied the power
to regulate interstate freight and passenger rates.
At the turning point in the line of decisions, which now fix
the exclusive power of Congress, Justice CuRTIs thought this
case authority that the States might legislate in the absence of
Cooley v. Port Wardens (i85i),
Congressional legislation:
12 How. (53 U. S) 299, 319.
Though the Justices of the Court which had decided Gibbons v. Ogden, and Wilson v. Marsl Co., passed away, there
were immediately those among their successors who combatted the inference drawn by TANEY and the Justices of his
school of political thought. Thus, Justice MCLEAN, in the
Passenger Cases, (1849) 7 How. (48 U. S.) 283, 397, pointed out
that the language used, while less guarded than usual,
should be construed in reference with the question before the
Court, especially as Gibbons v. Ogden was cited and not even
distinguished, much less overruled; and in Cooley v. Port
Wardens (185i), 12 How. (53 U. S.) 299, 324, again alluded
to this case as an illustration of the difficulty of restraining to
the facts of the case, so important a principle as that supposed
to lie in this opinion. In the Wheeling Bridge Case, the same
Justice distinguished this case as different in principle, adding,
in his understanding of the opinion, that-
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The Chief Justice [MARSHALl. had virtually] said it was a matter of
doubt whether the small creeks, which the tide makes navigable a short
distance, are within the general commercial regulation, and that in such
cases of doubt, it would be better for the Court to follow the lead of Congress : (13 How. 54 U. S. 566.)

In Gilman v. Philadelphia (1866), 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 713,
743, Justices CLIFFORD, WAYNE and DAVID DAVIS thought that
no man living had any reason to suppose that the views of
MARSHALL and his associates had changed, between Gibbonsv.
Ogden and Wilson v. Marsh Co. As these dissenting Justices
.held this case second in point of importance to no one delivered by MARSHALL, they considered that it decided the dam
in question to have been erected under the reserved police
powers of the State. Justice CLIFFORD repeated these sentiments in his concurring opinion in Hall v. De Cuir (1877) 5
Otto. (95 U. S.) 485, 514, 5 16, with approving mention of Justice McLEAN'S statement, supra.
In Cardwellv. American River Bridge Co. (1884), 13 U. S.
205, Justice FIELD cited this case and those following it, with
the explanation thatThese cases illustrate the general doctrine, now fully recognized, that
the commercial power of Congress is exclusive of State authority only
when the subjects upon which it is exerted, are national in their character,
and admit and require uniformity of regulations affecting alike all the
States, and that when the subjects within that power are local in their na-

ture or operation, or constitute mere aids to commerce, the States may
provide for their regulation and management, until Congress intervenes
and supersedes their action: (Id.)

To the same effect, per Bradley, J. Williamete Iron Bridge
Co. v. Hatch (1887), 125 U. S. I, 8 ; LAMAR, J. Kidd v. Pearson
(1888), 128 Id., I, 23.
VII.

A state may legislatefor the safety, happiness and prosperity
of its inhabitants,except when it is restrainedby the Constitution
of the United States.
A state inay require the commander of a vessel arrivingat a
port within itsjurisdiction,to reporthis passenger list.
The Mayor, etc., of New York v. Miln (1837), II Peters (36
U. S.) io2, raised the question of the constitutionality of
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another statute of New York (that of February I I, 1824), under which an action was begun in the Superior Court of that
-city against the consignee of the ship Emily for not reporting
the passenger list. The consignee being an alien, removed
the case into the Circuit Court of the United States and demurrer to the declaration: on a division of opinion between the judges, the question of the constitutionality of the
section requiring the certificate by the captain of such passenger list, was certified into the Supreme Court: See page 145
of the report, and per Justice WAYNE, in the Passenger Cases
(1849), 7 Howard (48 U. S.) 430. That section was thus summarized by Justice BARBOUR The statute, among other things, enacts that every master or commander
-ofany ship or other vessel arriving at the port of New York from any
country out of the United States, or from any other of the United States
than the State of New York, shall, within twenty-four hours after the arrival of such ship or vessel in the said port, make a report in writing, on
-oath or affirmation to the Mayor of the City of New York, or, in case of
-hissickness or absence, to the Recorder of the said City, of the name,
place of birth and last legal settlement, age and occupation of every person who shall have been brought as a passenger in such ship or vessel, on
-herlast voyage from any country out of the United States into the port of
New York, or any of the United States, and from any of the United States
,other than the State of New York to the City of New York, and of all passengers who shall have landed, or been suffered or permitted to land from
such ship or vessel, at any place, during such her last voyage, or have
been put on board, or suffered, or permitted to go on board of any other
ship or vessel, with the intention of proceeding to the said City, under the
penalty on such master or commander, and the owner or owners, consignee
-or consignees of such ship or vessel, severally and respectively of seventyfive dollars for every person neglected to be reported as aforesaid and for
-every person, whose name, place of birth, and last legal settlement, age,
.and occupation, or either or any of such particulars shall be falsely reported as aforesaid, to be sued for and recovered as therein provided.

Justice STORY, in his dissenting opinion, made a fuller state,
ment (page 153) though disclosing no other matters to influ•ence the decision.
The case was first reached during the lifetime of MARSHALL,
in January term, 1835, but the Court declined to consider it
until a vacancy in the bench occasioned by the resignation of
Justice Duval should be filled: 9 Peters (34 U. S.) 85. Chief
Justice MARSHALL died at Philadelphia, July 6, 1835, and one
of the counsel for the State of Maryland in the Brown case,
VOL. XXXVIII,-2
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ROGER BROOKE TANEY, was appointed to the vacancy and confirmed December 26, 1835. The case was then argued without result, as the Justices were equally divided in opinion, and
before the case was again reached, President Jackson appointed PHILIP PENDLETON BARBOUR, March 15, 1836, to the vacant
Justiceship. Upon the final disposition of the case, the Chief
Justice and Justice MCLEAN, agreed with Justice BARBOUR in
the opinion read by the latter; Justice STORY dissented; Justice THOMPSON wrote the opinion which a majority of the other
Justices could not agree to; he then read it as his individual
opinion; Justice BALDWIN afterwards wrote a separate opinion :
about his assent to the opinion read by Justice BARBOUR there
seems to be doubt: See the remarks -of Justice WAYNE and
Chief Justice TANEY in the Passenger Cases (1849), 7 How.
(48 U. S.) 283, 429, 487 ; and Justice WAYNE, assented to the
opinion of the Court only so far as to agree that the law of
New York was valid as a police regulation. For this reason
Justice BARBOUR could only express his own opinion, that
passengers were not the subject of commerce, and declareBut we do not place our opinion on this ground. We choose rather to
plant ourselves on what we consider impregnable positions. They are
these: that a State has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction
over all persons.and things within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation, where that jurisdiction is not surrendered, or restrained by the Constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, it is not only the
right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a State, to advance the safety,
happiness, and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general wel-

fare, by any and every act of legislation which it may deem to be conclusive to these ends; when the power over the particular subject, or the
manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained, in the manner just
stated. That all those powers'which relate to merely municipal legislation
or what may, perhaps, more properly be called internal police are not
thus surrendered or restrained, and that, consequently, in relation to these,
the authority of a State is complete, unqualified and exclusive: (ii
Peters, 36 U. S. i39.)

A consequence grew out of this language which was repudiated in the Passenger Cases by Justices MCLEAN and WAYNE
with the other Justices composing the majority of the Court;
that is, that the State could exercise its authority from the
first instant of the termination of a voyage, in direct opposition to the principles of Brown v. laryland.
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The dissenting opinion of STORY was placed upon the broad
ground that a State could not legislate in such a manner as to
act upon subjects either within or beyond its territorial limits,
if such action trenched upon an exclusive authority of Congress to regulate commerce, including passenger traffic: (I I
Peters, 36 U. S. 156, 158.) This is, of course, open to the
criticism of Justice THOMPSON, that the Court had not defined
the bounds of Congressional authority, and to that of KENT,
(ante, page 430) that it is not a question of State power, but
how far may the State go on legislating until there is a collision with the power confided to Congress; but it was, in effect,
adopted in the Passenger Cases, infra.
This opinion of STORY, he tells us himself, at the close of
this dissenting opinion, was concurred in by the then late
Chief Justice MARSHALL.
Justice BALDWIN's concurring opinion should be read in connection with the prefatory remarks to his General View of the
Origin and Nature of the Constitution and Government of the
United States:
As my opinions on constitutional questions are founded on a course of
investigation different from that which is usually taken, I cannot, in justie

to myself, submit them to the profession without a full explanation of
what may be deemed my peculiar views of the Constitution. By taking
it as the grant of peopleof the several States, I find an easy solution of all
questions arising under it; whereas, in taking it as the grant of the people
of the United States in the aggregate, I am wholly unable to make its various provisions consistent with each other, or to find any safe rule of interpreting them separately . (Id. i.)

This method of viewing the Constitution is worthy of this
passing notice because BALDWIN agreed with the judgment of
the Courtin Brown v. 17arylandand Gibbonsv. Ogden. Those
judgment%were entered upon opinions by Chief Justice MARSHALL, whose view of the Constitution was directly opposite:The powers of the Generalgovernment, it has been said, are delegated by
the States, -who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme dominion.
It would be difficult to sustain this proposition. The convention which
framed the Constitution was indeed elected by the State legislatures. But
the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal,
without obligation, or pretensions to it. It was reported to the then existing Congress of the United States, with a request that it might' "be sub-
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initted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each State by the people
-thereof,under the recommendation of its legislature, for their assent and
-ratification." This mode of proceeding was adopted; and by the conven-tion, by Congress, and by the state legislatures, the instrument was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which
they can act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in convention. It is true, they assembled in their several States-and
where else should they have assembled? No political dreamer was ever
wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the
states, and of compounding the American people into one common mass.
,Of consequence, when they act, they act in their states. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the
people themselves, or become the measures of the state governments.
From these conventions the Constitution derives its whole authority.
The government proceeds directly from the people; is "ordained and
established" in the name of the people; and is declared to be ordained,
"in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic
-tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their
posterity." The assent of the states, in their sovereign capacity, is implied in calling a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the
people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and
-their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and could not be
negatived, by the State governments. The Constitution, when thus
.adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the state sovereignties:
_McCulloclk v. The Stale of Afaryland (1819), 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 402-404.

The substance of this concurring opinion is still and is likely to remain, the interpretation, in this direction, of the commerce clause; it is as follows :It may therefore be taken as an established rule of constitutional law,
that whenever anything which is the subject of foreign commerce, is
-brought within the jurisdiction of a State, it becomes subject to taxation
.and regulation by the laws of a State so far as is necessary for enforcing
the inspection and all analogous laws, which are a part of its internal
police. And as these laws are passed in virtue of an original inherent
Tight in the people of each State to an exclusive and absolute jurisdiction
and legislative power, which the Constitution has neither granted to the
general government, nor prohibited to the States the authority of these
laws is supreme and incapable of any limitation or control by Congress:
iBald. Views, 188.

The construction of this clause of the Constitution would
therefore seem to be more uniform than the diverse political
views of the Judges might imply.
The judgment in this case decides nothing more than that
a State may require the name and quality of every foreigner
landing within its borders: WAYNE, J., Passenger Cases (I849)1
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,7 How. (48 U. S.) 283, 423, 425. And in this respect, has
been recognized as good law by Justice MILLER in the
Slaughtet House Cases (1873), 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36, 63,
and in Henderson v. The Mayor (1876), 92 U. S. 259, 269, and
infra;and by Justice SWAYNE in Machine Co. v. Gage (I88O),
IOO U. S. 676, 678.
The precise point decided must always be regarded in the
use of this case, as the principles of MARSHALL were there
seriously impugned, and remained so during a period of fourteen years, during which the divided Court agreed upon thi
judgment in the License Cases and with more unanimity of reason decided the PassengerCases. With Cooley v. Port Wardens, the principles of MARSHALL began again to prevail in the
Court, though the Justices have not yet been able to reach one
opinion. This is probably because they have not been able to
settle in their own minds, a reasonable definition of the police
power of the States.
VIII.

The power to regulate commerce among the several States is
grantedin the same clause, and by the same words, as that with
foreign nations,and is co-extensive with it.
Congress has the exclusive power to regudatecommerce among
the States, though it has been supposed that the States might act
until Congress interfered.
State laws requiring a license to sell liquors brought from a
foreign nation, or another State, were considered to be valid, but
now they ate declared to be void so far as respects their sale by
the importerin the originalpackage.
Pierce et. al. v. The State of New Hampshire' (1847), 5
Howard (46 U. S.) 505, was one of three cases heard and decided together and commonly known as the License Cases.
This case came before the highest court, the Supreme Court
of Judicature, in July Term, 1843, on a writ of error to a
judgment entered in the Court of Common Pleas at the preceding January Term, upon an indictment for selling a barrel
of gin, in violation of the State Act of July 4, 1838, which
was-
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Ax AcT regulating the sale of wine and spirituous liquors.
SECTioN x. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives,
-in General Court convened, That if any person shall, without license
-from the selectmen of the town or place where such person resides, sell
-any wine, rum, gin, brandy or other spirits in any quantity, or shall sell
-any mixed liquors, part of which are spirituous, such person so offending,
for each and every such offence, on conviction thereof, upon an indictment in the county wherein the offence may be committed, shall forfeit
;and pay a sum not exceeding fifty dollars, norless than twenty-five dollars,
for the use of such county.

The object of this Act, as well as of the laws questioned in
,the other two License Cases, was to discourage the use of
:ardent spirits, just as in the Original Package Case of 1890.
The defendants had purchased this barrel of gin in Boston,
Massachusetts, had brought it to their store in Dover, New
Hampshire, and had there sold and delivered it in its original
condition. The gin was of American manufacture and the
,commerce clause of the Constitution was unsuccessfully in,voked as a sufficient excuse for the sale without a license.
'Thus the law remained until 189o, while its downfall was being prepared by a line of cases commencing in 185 1, though
iindicated as early as the PassengerCases, in 1849.
The contention in this case raged over the effect of the de.cisions in Brown v. lMaryland and Miln v. New York, with
such violence that the Justices of the Supreme Court -of the
-United States could not agree upon the principles by which
-they severally thought the State license laws were constitu-:ional. The divergences of opinion are summarized byJustice
GRAY in his dissenting opinion, in the OriginalPackage Case,
infra,where he points out that ChiefJustice TANEY (page 578,)
and Justices CATRON and NELSON agreed in regarding the
New Hampshire statute as a regulation of interstate commerce,
but still valid for the reason that Congress has not yet regulated that particular kind of traffic; while Justices MCLEAN,
DANIEL, WOODBURY

and

GRIER,

were of one mind in holding

the statute a police regulation, for the preservation of public
health and order; otherwise the Justices did not agree. The
effect of this judgment of a divided Court was far more ex-tensive than any student of jurisprudence would have been
justified in predicting, for it became the basis for prohibition
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Constitutions and laws, and generally passed into the popular
knowledge as an affirmance of the police power of the States.
The great difficulty among the Justices of the Supreme
Court, was the effect of a grant of power to Congress; did it
a mount to a prohibition to the States, so as to render all State
laws on the subject, null and void? To those who answered
in the negative, the case of Brown v. Maryland,was easily distinguishable. As already pointed out with some care, thatwas
*acase of a foreign import. In these License Cases, the case
Telated to commerce among the States, and upon a subject upon which Congress had not legislated. Still the decision in
Brown v. Maryland, could have easily extended to forbidding
State regulation of the sale of Original Packages in the hands
-of those who brought them from a neighboring State; and now
,that such extension has been made, in the Original Package
Case, infra, these decisions in the License Cases are valuable
only for the precise points involved in the several judgments
of the Court.
The other two License Cases were Thurlow v. The Commonwealt&of Massachusetts and Fletcher v. The State of Rhode
Island. In the former case, the State laws allowed the county
commissioners to refuse to grant any licenses for the sale of
liquor, being in effect a local option act. The defendant had
been convicted, under these laws, of retailing without a license,
liquors purchased from an importer, and Webster once more
raised the plea of the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress (as he
had done in Gibbons v. Ogden), by putting the question,
whether such a State law, founded upon moral, medicinal,
economical or other reasons for promoting the public good,
could prevent the importer from selling to one who wofild
only buy to sell again. The Court, for various reasons, affirmed the validity of the Massachusetts laws.
In the Rhode Island case, there was a local option law and
a refusal to license. The defendant bought French brandy
from the importer and sold it again at retail, so that this case
differed from the Massachusetts case only in the fact that
the liquor was undoubtedly of foreign make. The argument
here assumed the form that no article was an import or an ex.port, but that the importation was merely an event in the his-
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tory of the article: from this the argument concluded thatany
tax upon the thing, even after the original package had been
broken, would be void. This was also denied by the Court
for various reasons.
These cases are worthy of some examination here,-in addition to the review given them in the O'-izal Package Case,
(infra)as the judgments rendered sustained the constitutionality of laws passed, according to Justice CATRON, (5 How. 46
U. S. 6oi) with a view to the entire prohibition of the liquor traffic. The State Courts in the prohibition States, naturally followed this judgment; thus, in Iowa, the now so-called On'ginal Package Case, (infra) was decided expressly in the State
Court (October 4, 1889) upon the authority of the previous
case of Collins v. Hills, decided February 7, 1889, where an
injunction to prevent a nuisance was sustained. The nuisance
was the selling of original packages or cases of beer brought
from an adjoining State; and in sustaining the injunction,
REED, C. J., made this reference :
The Statutes called in question in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, were
not essentially different in their object, from those of this State. They
were enacted for the purpose of mitigating, and to some extent, suppressing, the evils of intemperance. * * The same claim of right was urged in
these cases, that is here alleged by the defendant, viz.: that as the
liquors were transported into the States under the authority of the Federal
Constitution and statutes, it was not competent for the States to prohibit
their sale, or regulate the manner in which it should :be conducted. But
the Court held that the statutes were not in their operation in conflict
with the commercial provisions of the Federal Constitution. And it appears to us that this is necessarily so. * * * When property purchased
in another State, is transported to this State, and there delivered to the
purchaser, to be used or consumed within the State, the transaction, in
so far as it is governed by the provisions for the regulation of commerce

among States, is at an end.

The denial of the proposition contained in this last sentence, is the substance of such cases as the Original Package
Case of 189o.
As already noticed on page 421, there was an effort in this
case to secure the assent of the Court to the proposition that
a State might declare the liquor traffic injurious and calculated to introduce immorality, vice and pauperism, and consequently might forbid the sale of liquor. This proposition was
denied by the Chief T'iqtice-
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But it must be remembered that disease, pestilence and pauperism are
not subjects of commerce, although sometimes among its-attendant evils.
They are not things to be regulated and trafficked in, but to be prevented,
as far as human foresight and human means can guard against them. But
spirits and distilled liquors are universally admitted to be subjects of own.
ership and property, and are therefore subjects of exchange, barter, and
traffic, like any other commodity in which a right of property exists: (5
How, 46 U. S. 576-7.)

This statement is repeated by Chief Justice FULLER, in the
opinion of the court in the OriginalPackage Case, infra.
Justice CATRON took the other and equally unfavorable
view of the same assumption of power by a State, over interstate commerce, already alluded to. This was cited by Justice
FIELD, (concurring opinion in Bowman v. RR. Co.) in support
of his own statement, thatWhat is an article of commerce is determinable by the usages of the commercial world, and does not depend upon the declaration of any State:
(125 U. S. 5o.)

In the dissenting opinion of Justice GRAY, infra, the judgment in these License Cases, is said to have been treated as beyond question in a long series of cases reaching from Veazie
v. Moore to Mugler v. Ifansas. The first of these cases was
decided in 1852 (14 How. 55 U. S. 568), by nearly the same
Justices as the License Cases, and the utmost that can be said
of this recognition is that the new Justice (CuRTIs) concurred
though he had written the opinion in Cooley v. Port Wardens
in 185 I, without noticing the License Cases.
The next case mentioned, was Sinnot v. Davenport (1859),
22 How. 63 U. S. 227, a majority of the Court being composed of the same Justices, the two new Justices (CAMPBELL and
CLIFFORD) concurring. But CLIFFORD and WAYNE dissented
in the C'hestnut Street Bridge Case (supra,page 445), which is
the next cited.
None of these cases were decided upon the authority of
the License Cases, and none of them do more than cite the
principle of State action in the absence of Congressional regulation. But Pervearv. The Comm. (I866), 5 Wall. (72 U. S.)
475, 479, was a direct affirmance of the proposition, that the
State had exclusive control of the sale of home made liquors,
or those imported but in second hands; which always has
been good law.
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Another case cited by Justice GRAY, is Woodri7ff v. Parham (1868), 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 123; but the License Cases
were alludei to there only to aver a doubt if any material
proposition was decided: MILLER, J., p. 139.

And the same

Justice barely mentioned the name in Henderson v. The Mayor
(875), 2 Otto (92 U. S.) 259, 274.
Still another citation is Beer Co. v. Mass. (1877), 7 Otto (97
U. S.) 25, 33, where Justice BRADLEY distinguished these and
some other cases with the general concluding remarkOf course, we do not mean to Tay down any rule at variance with what
this Court has decided with regard to the paramount authority of the
Constitution and laws of the United States, relating to the regulation of
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States or otherwise: (Id. 33)

To the same effect is thc. citation of the coal case, Brown v.
Houston (1885), 114 U. S. 622, 63 1, where the opinion was also
written by Justice BRADLEY, who also wrote the opinion in
another citation, that is, the modern License Case of Walling-v.
.lficligan (I886), 1x6 U. S. 446, 461. But in this latter case,
the License Cases were mentioned because the State Court
thought the tax on the business of selling liquors to be shipped from another State, was justified by these and other cases.
To this Justice BRADLEY repliedNone of these cases, however, sustain the doctrine that an occupation
can be taxed, if the tax is so specialized as to operate as a discriminative
burden against the introduction and sale of the products of another State,
or against the citizens of another State: (116 U. S. 461.)

The opinion in United States v. De fitt (1870), 9 Wall. 76
U. S. 41, is also cited and it is supported by the citation of the
License Cases, but only upon the point that Congress cannot
exercise in the States police powers in the usual and restricted
sense of the term (see page 413). There is no doubt of this.
Justice GRAY also cites Mobile v. Kimball (i88o), 12 Otto
(102 U. S.) 691, 701 ; but there Justice FIELD did not treat the
License Cases as beyond question, for he first speaks of the
difficulty of ascertaining what principle was here established,
and then passed on to speak of the present rule of exclusion
in national subjects (see pages 42o and 437, supra). And this
was deliberate, for 'Justice FIELD, in his separate opinion in

AN ORIGINAL PACKAGE.

Jl ugler v. Kansas (1887), 123 U. S. 623, 676 (which is another
citation by Justice GRAY), saidThe construction of the commercial clause of the Constitution, upon
which the License Cases, in the 7th of Howard, were decided, appears to
me to have been substantially abandoned in later decisions. Hall v. DeCuir (1878), 95 U. S. 485 ; Welton v. State of Missouri (1876), 91 Id. 275;
County of il7obile v. Kimball (i88o), 102 Id. 691 ; Transfiortation Co. v.
Parkersburg(1882), 107 Id. 691; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania
(1884), 114 Id. 196; Wabash, St. Louis & PacificRailway Co. v. Illinois
(1886), 1i8 Id. 557- I make this reservation that I may not hereafter be
deemed included by a general concurrence in the opinion of the majority:
(123 U. S. 676.)

The majority of the Court composed of Chief Justice WAITE,
and Justices MILLER, BRADLEY, HARLAN, MATTHEWS and GRAY,
speaking by Justice HARLAN simply cited the License Cases,
as sanctioning the power of the State to forbid the manufacture of liquor, in a case coming into the Court under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; that is, on the
allegation that the privileges of a citizen had been abridged,
and his property destroyed without due process of law.
Justice FIELD substantially repeated his sentiments in Bowwan v. RR. Co. (I888), 125 U.S. 465, 507, where also Justice
MATTHEWS analyzed the License Cases and concluded that
the judgment was strictly confined to the right of a State to
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor, after it had been brought
within the territorial limits of the State: this was not the case
in hand and no further reference was required or made in the
opinion: (Id. 479.)
Ix.

Commerce includes navigation and the transportationof passengers, both upon the high seas and in the bays, harbors, lakes
and navigable waters within the United States.
A voyage is not ended until the passengers and merchandise
have been landed and disbursed in the State.
A common carrier cannot be required by a State, to pay a
capitation tax, or to be responsible for immigrants and interstate
passengers.
Except to guardagainstdisease or panperism, a State cannot
regulate immigration.
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A State cannot collect the expense of maintainingpaupers, or
of executing its police laws, by a tax on immzigrants.
Smitlk v. Turner and Norris v. The City of Boston, decided
together in January Term, 1849, and reported in 7 How. (48
U. S.) 283-573, are also known as the Passenger Cases, from
both of them *declaring invalid a tax on aliens arriving at
ports of the United States.
The case first named arose from certain sections of a law of
the State relating to the marine hospital in the City of New
York. Justice MCLEAN explained that, by the seventh section"The Health Commissioner shall demand and be entitled to receive,
and in case of neglect or refusal to pay, shall sue for and recover in his
name of office, the following sums from the master of every vessel that
shall arrive in the port of New York, viz:"1. From the master of every vessel from a foreign port, for himself
and each cabin passenger, one dollar and fifty cents; for each steerage
passenger, mate, sailor, or mariner, one dollar.
"2. From the master of each coasting vessel, for each person on board,
twenty-five cents; but no coasting vessel from the States of New Jersey,
Connecticut and Rhode Island, shall pay for more than one voyage in
each month, computing from the first voyage in each year."
The eighth section provides that the moneys so received shall be denominated "hospital moneys."
And the ninth section gives "each
master paying hospital moneys, a right to demand and recover from
each person, the sum paid on his account." The tenth section declares
any master who shall fail to make the above payments within twenty-four
hours after the arrival of his vessel in the port, shall forfeit the sum of
one hundred dollars.
By the eleventh section, the Commissioners of Health are required to
account annually to the Comptroller of the State for all moneys received
by them for the use of the marine hospital; "and if such moneys shall,
in any one year exceed the sum necessary to defray the expenses of their
trust, including their own salaries, and exclusive of such expenses as are
to be borne, and paid as part of the contingent charges of the City of
New York, they shall pay over such surplus to the treasurer of the Society
for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents in the City of New York, for
the use of the Society:" (7 How. 48 U. S. 792-3.)

Under this statute, Smith, the master of the British ship
Henry Bliss, was sued in the Supreme Court of New York,
for one dollar each for two hundred and ninety-five steerage
-passengers. A demurrer was filed on the ground that the
statute was a regulation of commerce and void. The Court
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overruled the demurrer and the Court of Errors affirmed the
action of the Supreme Court. Smith then removed the cause
to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the judgment was reversed, with costs, on the ground laid in the demurrer. This judgment was agreed to by Justices McLEAN,
WAYNE, CATRON, GRIER and MCKINLEY, and dissented from by
Chief-Justice TANEY and Justices DANIEL, NELSON and WOODBURY. All the Justices except NELSON, write separate opinions,
Justices McLEAN and WAYNE going further in upholding the
exclusiveness of the power of Congress than the other Justices composing the majority of the Court. As, however, it
was a bare majority, the Court, twenty-six years later, in
Henderson v. The M/ayor, infra, considered the question afresh,
though with the same result: MILLER, J., 92 U. S. 269-7o, and
in the Head Money Cases (1884), 112 U. S. 580, 592.
The importance of the decision appeared to Justice MCLEAN
to lie in the possibility of the tax imposed, operating to enforce non-intercourse between the States: (page 407.) As
Mississippi had been allowed (Groves v. Slaughter, 1841, 15
Peters, 4o U. S. 504) to prevent citizens of other States from
bringing in slaves as merchandise; as the State of Georgia
had imprisoned a missionary (Worcester v. Ga., 1832, 6 Peters,
31 U. S. 515) for preaching the gospel to the Cherokee Indians
without a license from the Governor of the State; as the same
State had attempted to prevent individual Indians from emigrating from the State (Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 1831, 5 Peters,
30 U. S. I, 8); as this case had followed the Miln case, and
was followed by those of Crandall, Henderson and the Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, not to mention others; there
was good cause for fearing non-intercourse State laws. If
there would be any doubt, it is removed by Justice WOODBURY
distinctly dissenting from fear that the laws of Mississippi,
Ohio, and other States against the entrance of negroes, would
be overthrown: page 567. The principle of the judgments,
therefore, closely related to interstate traffic. Still, of course,
the actual point decided was the invalidity of a tax on alien
immigrants: DANIEL, J., page 495.

The second case, Norris v. Boston, was begun in the Boston
Court of Common Pleas, by Norris, to recover two dollars
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exacted for each alien passenger landed by him in the City of
Boston, under an act of April 20, 1837, relating to alien passengers, and providing amongst other thingsSEc. 3. No alien passenger, other than those spoken of in the preceding section [i. e. lunatics, idiots, maimed, aged or infirm, etc.] shall be
permitted to land, until the master, owner, consignee, or agent of such
vessel shall pay to the regularly appointed boarding officer, the sum of
two dollars for each passenger so landed, and the money so collected shall
be paid into the treasury of the city or town, to be appropriated as the
city or town may direct for the support of foreign paupers.

The judgment was the same as in the New York case, and
the law was accordingly declared void as a regulation of
commerce, without passing upon the other sections relating to
lunatics and the like: per GRIER, J., page 457, who also differed
from the other Justices of the majority in thinking (page 463)
this law a tonnage tax, and so void; see page 425, supra.
All of the cases considered in this connection, depended
upon MARSHALL'S definition of commerce as the intercourse
of persons as well as traffic: Henderson v. The Mayor (1876), 2
Otto (92 U. S.) 259, 270, where Justice MILLER acknowledged
this to be the accepted canon of construction on all subjects
of commerce: STRONG, J., R. R. Co. v. Husen, (1878) 5 Otto (95
U. S.) 465, 470.

A determination was also called for, of the period of time
when the commerce power ceased and the police or State
power began. Upon this point, the result of the decision in
these cases, when taken with that in Brown v. Maryland (supra,
page 442), is to commit this determination to Congress and
the Supreme Court. Justice McKINLEY thought it one of the
most perplexing questions, and Congress not acting, the Court
finally, in these Passenger Cases, and those to be presently
noticed in this connection, laid down the rules stated above on
pages 459, 460. They were affirmed by the opinion of Justice
FIELD in Gloucester Fer-y Co. v. Pa. (1885), 114 U. S. 196, 213.
The opposite view made the passenger liable as soon as he
attempted to land: WOODBURY, J., Passenger Cases, page 537;
of which the consequences must have been the same as those
repudiated in Brown v. Maryland, respecting merchandise.
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The State's right of taxation was also involved, as in Brown
v. M'aryland,but was denied on the different ground, that the
law was not a quarantine regulation, because operating upon
all passengers; otherwise, the law could not operate as the
voyage had not yet been terminated: per MCLEAN, J., page
4OO, sqq; WAYNE, J., page 411; CATRON, J., page 447.
The fact of the tax falling eventually on the passenger himself, no matter by whom paid in the first instance, was admitted in all these cases: WAITE, C. J., in W. U. Tel. Co. v. Texas
(1882), 15 Otto (Io5 U. S.) 460, 465; MILLER, J., Henderson v.
Tie M'ayor (1876), 2 Otto (92 U. S.) 259, 268; Cook v. Pa.
(1878), 7 Otto (97 U. S.) 566, 572, and Morgan v. La. (1886),
118 U. S. 455,462; MATTHEWS, J., Bowman v. R. R. Co. (i888),
125 Id. 465, 492.

The supremacy of treaties was also considered, but not
necessarily; see above, page 416.
The power of a State to exclude immigrants, was denied
with full cognizance of the decision in Groves v. Slaughter
(1841), 15 Peters (4o U. S.) 449, which was distinguished as

relating to Slaves, over whom the commerce power did not
extend. Justice MCKINLEY would have decided these Passenger Cases upon this point (page 453); Chief-Justice TANEY
held the same view, though with the opposite opinion of
the law (page 465). And yet Groves v. Slaughter actually decided nothing more than that the Constitution of Mississippi did not apply to the promissory notes in suit: if
it had applied, then the right of a State to exclude persons,
even if slaves, would have been decided, and the dicta of the
different Justices worthy of consideration in this article.
The principle of this New York law was repeated by an act
of Nevada, passed March 9, 1865, requiring passenger transporters for hire to pay a tax of one dollar upon every person
leaving the State. The State Supreme Court (Exparte Crandall, i865, i Nev. 294,) sustained the law chiefly by the principles of the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice TANEY in the PassengerCases. This State Courtwas unanimous in holding thatthe
mere grant of power to Congress, could not imply a prohibition upon the State, but was a mere concurrent power, as laid
down by KENT, supra, page 430: and concluded that-
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The better rule, and that sustained by the preponderance of authority,
seems to be that subject and subordinate to the power of Congress, a State
may regulate commerce within its own jurisdiction, and its laws enacted
for that purpose are unconstitutional only when they conflict with, or are
repugnant to some act or regulation of the General Government. This
rule removes all possible difficulties * * * In other -words, the States
are enabled to'protect themselves, not from the laws or constitutional authority of Congress, but from its inaction: LEwis, C. J., iNev. 313.

Crandall did not appear in the Supreme Court of the United
States, but counsel for the State did, and curiously presented
a brief containing not a word on the Passenger Cases, though
the opinion of the Nevada Court, printed in the record, did
admit the opinions and reasonihngs of Justices McLEAN, WAYNE
and GRIER, to be unmistakably in conflict with their position.
They pointed out that Justice CATRON had agreed to the judgment only on account of certain laws of Congress, and therefore concluded that the Passenger Cases were not authority for
the exclusive power of Congress.
The Supreme Court declared the Nevada law to be unconstitutional: Crandallv.Nevada (1868), 6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 35, by
a Court divided upon the particular Constitutional power,
which has been transgressed in taxing passengers. Chief Justice CHASE and Justice CLIFFORD holding it to be a regulation
of commerce, and Justice MILLER, in the opinion of the Court,
with assent of Justices SWAYNE, DAVID DAVIS, NELSON, GRIER,
MILLER and FIELD, thought otherwise and declared the invalidity of the law on the other ground of a conflict with these'
implied powers which prevent a State from affecting the functions of the government. This seems an extension of the
principles of fcCnllocz v. Maryland (1819), 4 Wheat. (I7 U.
S.) 316, to hold that the travelling of citizens and aliens on
private business was a function of the government; and subsequently Justice MILLER cited this Crandall case as avoiding
a tax on commerce, in Woodruff v. Parham (1869), 8 Wall.
(75 U. S.) 123, 138, and in Fargov. Stevens (1887), 121 U. S.
230, 241; though still recognizing his original ground in
Hinson v. Lott (1869), Id. 148, 152, in the Slaughter House
Cases (1873), 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36, 79, and, justly, when dissenting, in B. & 0. RR. Co. v. Old. (1875), 21 Wall. (88 U. S.)
456, 475; as was pointed out by STRONG, J., in State Freight
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Tax Case (873) 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 232, 280; and by MATTHEWS, J., with approval, in JMforan v. . 0. (1884), 112 U. S.
69, 73.
This case was recognized as annulling a tax upon commerce,
between the States, by BRADLEY, J., in B. & 0. RR. Co. v. Md,.,
supra; in Tiansportation Co. v. Parkersburg (883), 17 Otto
(07 U. S.) 691, 702, and in Phila.& S. Nl. S. Co. v. Pa.(1887),
122 U. S. 326, 339; by BLATCHFORD, J., in Pickardv. Pullman
S. C. Co. (1886), 117 U. S. 34, 48.
As in the Miln case, a portion of the State Statute not considered by the Court for technical reasons, required a bond from
the master for every passenger, conditioned for the maintenance of the passenger and his children, if they became paupers
within two years; so in these Passenger Cases, substantially
that provision came to be considered and found void. Immediately, the State modified the statute so as to require a report similar to that in the Miln case (ante, page 449), and to
further require the Mayor of the City to endorse on this report
a demand for a bond for four years indemnity, or the sum of
one dollar and fifty cents, per passenger, under a penalty of
five hundred dollars for each passenger: per MILLER, J., Henderson v. The M7ayor (1876), 2 Otto (92 U. S.) 259, 266. This
attempt of the State was also a failure, as was also the next
one, attempted by Act of May 31, 1881, to require one dollar
for each alien passenger, for the execution of the State inspection laws: IV. Y v. Compagnie (1882), U. S. Cir. Ct., S. Dist.,
N. Y. io Fed. 357, 360, 365 ; affirmed, 107 U. S. 59; and a
similar law in Louisiana was also declared unconstitutional,
for the same reason of interfering with commerce: Commissioners of Immigration v. Nortli German Lloyd (1876), 2 Otto
(92 U. S.) 259. So, also, "a most extraordinary statutes" of
California, requiring similar bonds from the vessel master,
owner or consignee, whenever the State Commissioner of Immigration has satisfied himself of the arrival (in this case) of
lewd and debauched women; with a commutation fee to be
fixed by the Commissioner himself, whose perquisite was
twenty per centum of the commutation moneys: Shy Lung v.
Freeman (1876), 2 Otto (92 U. S.) 275, 277, 278.

As the States could not exact a tax upon commerce, some of
VOL XXXVIII.-3o.
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the consignees of foreign vessels also thought that there was
no power to tax in the government of the United States, and
brought suit to recover the sums required to be paid for each
immigrant by Act of Congress of August 3, 1882 (23 Stat.
at Large 214). The suit failed, as both the Circuit Court (in
an opinion by Justice BLATCHFORD, Edye v. Roberlson, 1883,
U. S. Circ. Ct. E. Dist. N. Y. 18 Fed. Repr. 135), and the
Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice MILLER, Head Voney
Cases, 1884, 112 U. S. 580, 596), held this Act to be a valid
exercise of the commerce power.
X.
Whatever subjects of the Constitutionalpower to regulate commerce, are, in their nature, national,or admit only of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they are exclusively in the
power of Congress to regulate or not.
A State law regulatingpilotsis valid untl it comes into coll.
sion with an Act of Congress.
Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia
12 How. (53 U. S.) 299, originated (April 3, 1847) in a
proceeding before Alderman Thomas D. Smith of the City of
Philadelphia, for the recovery of eight dollars and forty-four
cents, claimed of A. B. Cooley, consignee of the schooner
Emily, as half pilotage incurred under the Twenty-ninth section of the act of March 29, 1803, P. L. 542, 560, in consequence of the refusal of the master to take a pilot on an outward voyage to a port not within the River Delaware. The
Section of the statute proceeded under, provided :--

(I85I ),

SeC. 29. And be zt furter
enacted by the autlwrily aforesaid,That
every ship or vessel arriving from, or bound to any foreign port or place,
and every ship or vessel of the burden of seventy-five tons or more, sailing from or bound to any port not within the river Delaware, shall be obliged to receive a pilot ; and it shall be the duty of the master of every
such ship or vessel during thirty-six hours next after the arrival of such
ship or vessel at the city of Philadelphia, to make report to the master warden of the name of such ship or vessel, her draught of water, and
the name of the pilot who shall have conducted her to the port, and where
any such vessel shall be outward bound, the master of such vessel shall
make known to the wardens the name of such vessel, and of the pilot
who is to conduct her to the capes, and her draught of water at that time;
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and it shall be the duty of the wardens to enter every such vessel in a
book, to be kept by them for that purpose, without fee or reward; and if
the master of any ship or vessel shall neglect to make suchreport, he shall
forfeit and pay the sum of sixty dollars, and if the master of any such
ship or vessel shall refuse or neglect to take a pilot, the master, owner
or consignee of such vessel, shall forfeit and pay to the wardens aforesaid, a sum equal to the half pilotage of such ship or vessel, to the use of
the society for the relief of distressed and decayed pilots, their widows
and children, to be recovered as pilotage in the manner hereinafter directed: (P. L. x8o2-3, pp. 56o-I.)

Judgment was duly rendered against Cooley who appealed
to the Court of Common Pleas, where the judgment was affirmed, November 22, 1847 ; as also happened on appeal in the
State Supreme Court, January 31, 185o, and, on final appeal
in the Supreme Court of the United States, December Term,
1851. The law of Pennsylvania and similar statutes were thus
declared to be valid, and not in contravention of those clauses
of the Constitution, which require uniformity in duties, imposts
and excises, and which grant Congress the power to regulate
commerce: (supra, pages 420, 424, 425; and also Packet Co.
v. Keokuk, 1877, 5 Otto, 95 U. S. 8, 88; Wilson v. lIcNamee
1881, I2 Otto, 102 U. S. 572, 575; Justice BLATCHFORD in
Turner v. Mlfaryland 1883, 17 Otto, 107 U. S. 38, 56; and Justice
BRADLEY, in Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg 1883, Id. 691,
702, 703 ; and Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken 1887, 12 1 U. S.

444, 447); nor of a coasting license, as in Gibbons v. Ogden;
nor of the United States Statutes, except where they collide
(similarly, Steamship Co. Jole, 1864, 2 Wall. 69 U. S. 450,
per

FIELD, NELSON, GRIER,

'WTAYNE

and

CLIFFORD,

and

SWAYNE,

JJ., against MILLER,

JJ., dissenting).

This precise question was again before the Court in 1872

(Exparte JIcNie, 13 Wall. 80 U. S. 236, 242), and the Court
unanimously reaffirmed the decision in Cooley v. Port Wardens, Justice SWAYNE saying that they were entirely satisfied with
that adjudication. The other concurring members of the
Court were Chief Justice CHASE, and Justices DAVID DAVIS,
STRONG, CLIFFORD, MILLER, FIELD, and BRADLEY; Justice
NELSON not sitting through illness.
The opinion of the Court in Cooley v. Port Wardens, was
written by Justice CURTIS, who had been appointed September

THE LAW GOVERNING

from the bar of Boston, Massachusetts. The concurring Justices were TANEY, Chief Justice, and CATRON, MCKINLEY, NELSON and GRIER, Associate Justices. Justice McLEAN dissented, because State pilot laws could have no force
as regulations of commerce, until adopted by Congress (pages
322-3); Justice WAYNE also dissented, and Justice DANIEL
agreed only to the judgment, because the Constitutional power
over commerce did not appropriately and necessarily extend
to such local subjects as the means of precaution and safety,
adopted within the waters or limits of a State, for the preservation of vessels, cargoes, navigators and passengers (page
326).
The subject of pilotage lies outside the bounds of this article,
except so far as determining the exclusiveness of the Constitutional power over commerce and the authority of Congress
to adopt local regulations.
The dissenting opinion of Justice DANIEL is not far removed
in principle fromthat of the Court, for Justice CuRTIs denied
that there was any conflict between this Pennsylvania statute
and the Tenth Section of the Constitution, (supra, page 425)
because22, 1851,

Indeed, the necessity of conforming regulations of pilotage to the local
peculiarities of each port, and the consequent impossibility of having its
charges uniform throughout the United States, would be sufficient of
itself, to prove that they could not have been intended to be embraced
within this clause of the Constitution: for it cannot be supposed uniformity was required, when it must have been known to be impracticable:
(12 How. 53 U. S. 314.)

The Passenger Cases, supra, really called for a decision upon
the exclusiveness of the constitutional power, but the four
Justices, who, with Justice MCLEAN, composed the majority
of the Court, differed from him in believing that a decision
could be rendered without going to that extreme: WAYNE, J.,
page 411 ; CATRON, J., page 446; GRIER, J., page 462, who also

thought that Congress had acted in confirming treaties
which provided for the free admission of aliens. The position
of Justice McLEAN has, however, since been adopted, with an
important exception, in such cases, under the rule first formulated in Cooley v. Port Wardens, as a subject of national,
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and even international character, and to be governed by uniform laws: MILLER, J., Henderson v. The Mayor (i876), 2 Otto
(92 U. S.) 259, 272, 273; and People v. Compagnie (1883), 17
Otto (107 U. S.) 59, 6o; CLIFFORD, J., concurring in Hall v.
DeCuir (1878), 5 Otto (95 U. S.) 485, 497; FIELD, J., Mobile
v. Kfimball (I88I), 12 Otto (lO2 U. S) 691, 702; Escanaba
County v. Chicago (1883), 17 Otto (107 U. S.) 678, 687; IV.
U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton (1887), 122 U. S. 347, 357; BRADLEY,
J., TransportationCo. v. Parkersbuhg(I883),17 Otto (107 U. S.)
691, 702; Robbins v. Taxing District (1887), 120 U. S. 489,
492, and Walling v. Z0ich. (1886), 116 Id. 446, 455.
Chief Justice TANEY continued in the Passenger Cases, to
hold the same opinion as in the License Cases, supra,page 454,
gracefully dissenting in these words referring to the judgment
in the latter Cases:I do not, however, object to the revision of it, and am quite willing
that it be regarded hereafter as the law of this Court, thatits opinion upon
the construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it
is supposed to have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority
should hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which
it is supported: (Page 47o.)

The rule for testing the exclusiveness of the commerce
power, as stated on page 466 was formulated by Justice CuRTIS, while carefully deciding no more than the validity of the
pilot laws before the Court (12 How. 53 U. S. 320) ; but this
conclusion was reached through an affirmance of the national
control of navigation (supra, page 428), an acknowledgment
that pilot laws do constitute regulations of commerce and that
Congress had already been compelled to intervene (12 How.
53 U. S. 36), and a statement that the law of Pennsylvania
had not been interferred with by Congress (Id. 318); whereby
the decision necessarly defined the powers remaining in the
States.
This question has never been decided by this Court, nor, in our judgment, has any case depending upon all the considerations which must
govern this one, come before this Court.
The grant of commercial power to Congress, does not contain any
terms which expressly exclude the States from exercising an authority
over its subject matter. If they are excluded, it must be because the
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mature of the power, thus granted to Congress, requires that a similar
authority should not exist in the States.
If it were conceded on one side, that the nature of this power, like that
to legislate for the District of Columbia, is absolutely and totally repugmant to the existence of similar power in the States. probably no one
would deny that the grant of power to Congress, as effectually and perfectly excludes the States from all future legislation on the subject, as if
express words had been used to exclude them.
And, on the other hand, if it were admitted that the existence of this
power in Congress, like the power of taxation, is compatible with the existence of a similar power in the States. then it would be in conformity
with the contemporary exposition of the Constitution, (Federalist No.
32, infra), and with the judicial construction, given from time to time by
this Court after the most deliberate consideration, to hold that the mere
grant of such a power to Congress, did not imply a prohibition on the
States to exercise the same power; that it is not the mere existence of
such a power, but its exercise by Congress, which may be incompatible
with the exercise of the same power by the States, and that the States may
legislate in the absence of Congressional regulations : (Sturgisv. Crowninshield 1819, 4 Wheat. 47 U. S. 193; Moore v. Houston, 1820, 5
Wheat. 46 U. S. I; Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. supra, page
445.)
The diversities of opinion, therefore, which have existed on this subject have arisen from the different views taken of the nature of this power. But when the nature of a power like this is spoken of, when it is said
that the nature of the power requires that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, it must be intended to refer to the subjects of that power,
and to say they are of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation
by Congress. * * *
Bither absolutely to affirm or deny, that the nature of this power re,quires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of
the subjects of this power, and to assert concerning all of them what is
really applicable, but to a part. Whatever subjects of this power are, in
their nature, national, or admit only of one uniform system or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive
legislation by Congress: CURTIS, J., Cooley v. Port Wardens (1851), 12
How. (53 U. S.) 318-20.

This statement of the exclusiveness of the Constitutional
power has been recognized as correct by Justice GRAY, dissenting in the OriginalPackage Case, infra ; Justice MATTHEWS, in Bowmanv. Chicago & N. W. RR. Co. (1888), 125 U.
S. 465, 481; Justice FIELD, Id. 508;
Pila.

Steams/Pp

326, 339;
492; in

Co. v.

in Robins v.

Justice BRADLEY, in
Pennsylvania (1887), 122 U. S.

Taxing District (887),

Brown v. Houston (1885),

114 Id.

120 Id.

489,

622, 63o, and
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in Ex parte Siebold (I88O), IO Otto (lO9 U. S.) 371, 385;
Ra/i v. DeCuir (I878), 5
Otto (95 U. S.) 485, 497, 516; Justice STRONG in the Case
of the State firei*-ezlt Tax (1873), 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 232,
28o; Justice MILLER, in Henderson v. Tue Mayor (1876) 2
Otto (92 U. S.) 259, 272, and in Iinson v. Lott (1869), 8
Wall. (75 U. S.) 148, 153, and in Crandall v. Nevada (1868),
6 Wall. (73 U. S) 35, 42; Justice SWAYNE, in Gilnan v. Phl/a.
(1865), 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 713, 721 ; though Chief Justice
WAITE, not only in Stone v. .Mssissippi(sup-a, pages 411-I2),
Justice CLIFFORD concurring in

but also in Haliv. DeCuir(1878), 5 Otto (95 U. S.) 485, 488,
declared thatThe line which separates the powers of the States from this exclusive
power of Congress, is not always distinctly marked, and oftentimes it is
not easy to determine on which side a particular case belongs. Judges
not unfrequently differ in their reasons for a decision in which they concur. Under such circumstances, it would be a useless task to undertake to
fix an arbitrary rule by which the line must, in all cases, be located. It is
far better to leave a matter of such delicacy to be settled in each case, upon
a view of the particular rights involvcd.

In addition to what has been already explained (pages 421,
a difficulty must be observed. Five years before Gibbons
v. Ogden was decided, the same Justices held that the power
conferred in the same section of the Constitution, to establish
an uniform rule of naturalization and an uniform bankrupt
law, were not exclusive. But such decision was rendered
because these powers were said to be of a difficult description
from those which require Congress to exercise exclusive
powers ; in the latter case, the rule was also plainly declared422),

Whenever the terms in which a power is granted by the Constitution,
to Congress, or wherever the nature of the power itself requires that it
shall be exclusively exercised by Congress, the subject is as completely
taken away from State Legislatures as if they had been forbidden to act
upon it: MARSHAIL, C. J. (1819), 4 Wheat. (I7 U. S.) 122, 193.

The opposite view was believed by TANEY and WOODBURY
to be the same as the construction given to the Constitution
by the eminent men who were concerned in framing it, and
active in supporting it: that is-
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The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases, results from
the division of the sovereign power ; and the rule that all authorities, of
which the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor, is not only a theoretical consequence of that
division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument
which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution. We there find,
that notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities, there
has been the most pointed care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses, prohibiting the exercise of them by the States. The Tenth
Section of the First Article consists altogether of such provisions: The
Federalist, No. 32.

All of which was, however, subject to the Sixth Article
(supra, page 42s), and consequently amounted in practice to
no more than the position of KENT, to be again noticed presently.
Still there was no mere arbitrary division of the powers of
Congress, and Justice MCLEAN, in these Passenger Cases, considered the test to be the same as subsequently laid down in
the line of cases beginning ten years latter with Cooley v.
Port Wardens; namely, the local action of the State in bankruptcies, as well as in governing the militia (see Houston v.
1loore (1820), 5 Wheat. i8 U. S. I), and this is probably what
MARSHALL, meantIf, in the opinion of Congress, uniform laws concerning bankruptcies
ought not to be established, it does not follow that partial laws may
not exist, or that State legislation on the subject must cease: Slurgis v.
Crowninslzeld (1819), 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 196.

At least, this seems to be the understanding of Justice
in Robins v. Taxing District (1887), 120 U. S. 489,
492, and the concurring Justices, M I.LLER, HARLAN, MATTHEWS,
and BLATCHFORD. As Justice MATTHEWS did not sit, and
Chief Justice WAITE dissented with Justices GRAY and FIELD,
in the uniformity of the license, this understanding may be
regarded as approved.
Against the exclusiveness of the Constitutional power, the
practical position of KENT, supra, pages 421, 430, was frequently opposed, and as often denied: in the PassengerCases,
the judgment of the Court was the first to be placed upon the
ground of exclusiveness, in denial of ungranted right in the
BRADLEY,
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States to legislate until Congress might choose to act. The
right not recognized as remaining in the State, would have
compelled Congress to legislate in the negative. This was
thought by Justice MCLEAN in Groves v. Slaughter(1841), 15
Peters 4o U. S.449, 504, to be as fatal to the spirit of the Constitution as it was opposed to its letter. Under the prevailing
interpretation, there are some, like Justice WOODBURY in Pasenger Cases 7. How. (48 U. S.) 560, who will regard the
silence of Congress more formidable than its action; but all
such persons do not wish to admit the full extent of the Constitutional powers.
In the course of his concurring opinion in Gibbonsv. Ogden,
Justice JOHNSON digressed to criticise the arguments advanced
to establish the concurrent power of the State government,
under the Tenth Section of the Constitution, supra,page 425;
while merely dicta, the language is worthy of remark here:The same bale of goods, the same cask of provisions, or the same ship,
that may be the subject of commercial regulation, may also be the vehicle
of disease. And the health laws that require them to be stopped and
ventilated, are no more intended as regulations on commerce than the
laws which permit their importation are intended to inoculate the community with disease. Their different purposes mark the distinction between the powers brought into action ; and when frankly exercised, they
can produce no serious collision: (9Wheat. 22 U. S. 235.)

Chief Justice MARSHALL, upon a view which appeared to him
to be narrow, would have construed this Section with equal
advantage to interstate commerceIf it be arule of interpretation to which all assent that the exception of
a particular thing from general words, proves that, in the opinion of the
law-giver, the thing excepted would be within the general clause, had the
exception not been made, we know of no reason why this general rule
should not be as applicable to the Constitution as to other instruments.
If it be applicable, then this exception in favor of duties for thesupport of
inspection laws, goes far in proving that the framers of the Constitution
classed taxes of a similarcharacter with those imposed for the purposes of
inspection, with duties on imports and exports, and supposed them to be
prohibited: Browa Maryland, 12 Wheat. 25 U. S. 438.

This rule of interpretation, wvas approved by
wiN, in Rhode Islandv. M/7ass. (1838), 12 Peters
717; and a particular result, as applied to State
thought to be vital to the existence of the

Justice BALD(37 U. S.) 657,
taxation, was
Constitutional
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powers, by MARSHALL, C. J. ; Mc Cullough v. 3aryland(18 19),
4 Wheat (I 7 U. S.) 316; McLEAN, J., Passenger Cases (849),
7 How. (48 U. S.) 283, 404, 406; CATRON, J., Dred Scott v.
Sandford (1856), 19 How. (6o U. S.) 393, 528.
The dissent of Justice McLEAN being placed upon the action
of Congress towards the State pilot laws, this would be an appropriate place to consider the effect of such Congressional
action, but for the recent statute (infra), carrying out the suggestion of Chief Justice FULLER, in the OriginalPackage Case.
The subject will, therefore, be deferred until that statute is
reached in the course of this article.
XI.

There is no State sovereignity which is exclusive of the Constitutionalregudation of commerce.
An act of Congress admitting a State into the Union, or ratifya compact between two or more States, is not a regulation of
commerce, and the Constitutional power cannot be restrictedin
this manner.
A State may regulate its internal commerce, notwithstanding
a conidition of its admission into the Union, requiringfreedom of
the particular commerce afterwards regudaed. Such condition
operates only to prevent discrimination against the citizens of
other States.
An in~junction billwill lie in the Courts of the United States, to
restrain an interference with commercial intercourse, which
amounts to a nuisance, or creates irreparabledamage, notwith.
standing the absence of Congressional action, either upon the
.particularsubject or generally, prohibiting and punishing nuisanis.
A State may proceed in the Courts of the United States, to
Irevent or abate an obstruction to commercial intercourse growing out of State improvements.
Congress may legalize an interference with commercial intereourse.
A bridge over an interstate water-way, is not necessarily incompatible with navig-ation.
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Congresscan authorize the construction of bridges, dykes and
other structuresfor the assistance of commerce.
The case of The State of Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., began on the sixteenth of August, 1849,
by the presentation of an injunction bill to Justice GRIER, sitting at Philadelphia, whereby the interference with navigation
in the river Ohio was made the foundation for the complaint
against a bridge, then in course of erection across the channel
of the river at Wheeling. The cause was adjourned to the
Supreme Court in banc, where in January Term, 1850, it
was referred to ex-Chancellor *Valworth, of New York, as
commissioner, to report upon the facts: (9 How. 50 U. S. 65 7),
Justice DANIEL dissenting here and always throughout the
case, because he considered the Court without jurisdiction: (9
How. 5o U. S. 659; 13 How. 54 U. S. 594; 18 How. 59 U. S.
45 I); a question which cannot be pursued in this article for
want of space.
The testimony having been taken (ii How. 52 U. S. 528),
and counsel having cited the repeated refusal of Congress to
authorize this bridge for the reason avowed in the bill, the
Court proceeded to declare this suspension bridge a nuisance,
to be abated by changing the elevation of the floor: (13
How. 54 U. S. 518, 578, 625). The opinion was written by
Justice MCLEAN, with the assent of Justices WAYNE, CATRON,
MCKINLEY, NELSON, GRIER and CURTIS; Chief Justice Taney
and Justice DANIEL dissented, the latter, among other reasons,
upon the matter of fact ground that the testimony did not disclose a nuisance: (Id. 602.)
The Chief Justice strenuously objected to the assertion of
the power to abate a nuisance without an Act of Congress;
and this not only upon his general principle that the State
might act until Congress legislated, but, also, that there was
no common law of the United States: (13 How. 54 U. S.
580.) Justice MCLEAN, speaking for the majority of the Court
upon the latter ground, claimed only the chancery jurisdiction
conferred by the Judiciary Act, and now incorporated in the
Revised Statutes asSc. 723. Suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the Courts
of the United States, in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete
remedy may be had at law.
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The power to enjoin is now firmly settled, as to questions of
taxation and interference with commerce, by a long line of
cases of which only a few need be mentioned here: Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg(1883), 17 Otto (107 U. S.) 691;
the Virginia Coupon Cases (1885), 114 U. S. 311, 314,- 315,
336, and citations, whose controlling principle was declared
also by Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Osborn v. The Bank (I 824) ,
9 Wheat. (22 U. S.) 738, 858-9; Starin v. N. Y. (885), 115
U. S. 248, 257; also, 1rwin v. Dixion (I85o), 9 How. (50 U.S.)
10, 27, a case of an obstruction of ancient lights; Davis v. Gray
(1873), i6 Wall. (83 U. S.) 203, 220, where a receiver appointed by a United States Circuit Court was aided against a
State Governor; Tennessee v. Davis (I88o), IO Otto (IoO U.S.)
257, 264, where a deputy collector of internal revenue was released from a charge of murder; Cunningham v. lMacon & B.
RR. Co. (1883), 1O9 U. S. 446, 455, where an injunction was
refused because a State was a necessary party; In re Ayers
(1887), 123 Id. 443, -where a State officer was released from
imprisonment for disobeying an injunction.
Upon the general subject of an interference with commerce,
the decree was made because Congress had legislated in respect to the river, and the law of Virginia, authorizing the
bridge, must give way to the paramount authority. The Congressional action consisted in approving the compact between
the States of Virginia and Kentucky (vide infra), and per
BRADLEY, J., Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg(1883), 17 Otto,
(107 U. S.) 691, 705, and Williamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatcl
(1888), 125 U. S. I, 16, but that does not affect the principle-of
the case, which was thus declared by Justice McLEAN (13 How.
54 U. S. 566), and recognized by Justice NELSON (18 How.
59 U. S. 430), and suibsequently by Justice SWAYNE, in the
Chestnut Street Bridge Case of Gilman v. Phi/a. (1866), 3
Wall. (70 U. S.) 713, 727.

The distinction between this last

case and the Wheeling Bridge Case is pointed out infra, page
482.
But for this effect of the approval, by Congress, of the compact, undoubtedly attention would have been given to the interference with the steamboat licenses, as in Gibbons v. Ogden,
supra, as was actually the case in Sinnott v. Davenport (infra).
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The entry of the final decree was deferred until the first
Monday of February, 1853, to permit a voluntary abatement
of the nuisance. Then, in 1854, the bridge was blown down
by a violent storm, and while its reconstruction was under way,
the complainant filed a new bill and obtained a preliminary injunction, June 26, 1854. This injunction was disregarded by
the bridge company, and the bridge was reconstructed by
November of the same year, under the authorization of tvo
sections tacked on to the Post-office Appropriation bill, approved August 31, 1852
SEc. 6. And be itfiurther enacted, That the bridges across the Ohio
river at Wheeling, in the State of Virginia, and at Bridgeport, in the State
of Ohio, abutting on Zane's Island, in said river, are hereby declared to
be lawful structures in their present position and elevation, and shall be
so held and taken to be, anything in any law or laws of the United States
to the contrary notwithstanding.
SEc. 7. And be itfurther enacted, That the said bridges are declared
to be and are established post-roads for the passage of the mails of the
United States, and that the Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company are
authorized to have and maintain their said bridges at their present site and
elevation; and the officers and crews of all vessels and boats navigating
said river, are required to regulate the use of their said vessels and boats,
and of any pipes or chimneys belonging thereto, so as not to interferewith
the elevation and construction of said bridges: (io Stat. at Large 112.)

The bridge being legalized, all proceedings fell, including
the punishment impending for disregarding the injunction.
Justice NELSON wrote the opinion of the Court sustaining the
constitutionality of the legalizing Act under the commerce
powers, without entering at all upon the question of the power
-"to establish post-offices and post-roads," as to which Justice
McLEAN came to an unfavorable conclusion, in his dissenting
opinion (18 How. 59 U. S. 431, 441); but the subject cannot
be considered here, at all.
Under the commerce powers, the Act was allowed to annul
the decree of the Court, with explicit recognition of the general proposition that no act of Congress could ordinarily do
so, and, in this case, could not do so as respects the costs,
which the Bridge Company was compelled to pay (page 459);
though as to this Justice DANIEL dissented.
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But that part of the decree, directing the abatement of the obstruction,
is executory, a continuing decree, which requires not only the removal of
the bridge, but enjoins the defendants against any reconstruction or continuance. Now, whether it is a future existing or continuing obstruction,
depends upon the question, whether or not it interferes with the right of
navigation. If, in the meantine, since the decree, this right has been
modified by the competent authority, so that the bridge is no longer an
unlawful obstruction, it is quite plain the decree of the court cannot be
enforced: NErsoN, J., iS How. (59 U. S.) 431-2.

Justice MCLEAN denied to Congress the power to authorize
a bridge, as the Constitutional power was one of regulation
and not construction: (13 How. 54 U. S. 623 and I8 How. 5g
U. S. 442, 445); but the majority of the Court necessarily
thought otherwise, and their view has remained the accepted
construction. It is an inevitable consequence of the exclusiveness of the Constitutional power: supra, pages 420, 466;
Justice NELSON, in The Clinton Bridge (1870), 10 Wall. (77
U. S.) 454, 462 ; Justice STRONG, in S. C. v. Ga. (1876), 3 Otto
(93) U. S. 4, 13; Chief Justice CHASE, in the captured and
abandoned property case of U. S. v. Klein (1872), 13 Wall.
(80 U. S.) 128, 146; Justice SWAYNE, in -The Chicago & N. W.
RR. Co. v. Fuller (1873), 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 56o, 569; Justice
MILLER, in Stockdale v. Atlantic Ins. Co. (1874), 20 Wall. (87
U. S.) 323, 332, and Wisconsin v. Dullutl (878), 6 Otto (96
U. S.) 379, 387; ChiefJustice WAITE, in Newport & Ci. Bridge
Co. v. U. S. (882), 15 Ott9 (1O5 U. S.) 470, 475, 480, and
Justice FIELD, dissenting in the same case, page 493 ; Justice
BRADLEY, in the Arthur Kill bridge case of Stockton v. B. & N.
Y. RR. Co. (1887), U. S. Cir. Ct., Dis't. N. J., 32 Fed. Repr. 9;
S. C. 27 AMER. LAW REGISTER 775.
There was another objection to this Act of Congress,
founded upon the preference clause of the Ninth Section of
the Constitution (supra, page 424); this was denied by the
majority of the Court, though advocated by Justice McLEAN,
in his dissenting opinion. Want of space forbids further consideration than will be given in connection with IMtnn v.,
Illinois,infra.
In the last stage of the case Justice WAYNE agreed generally with Justice MCLEAN in his dissent, and Justice GRIER.
to the extent of objecting to the Act of Congress.
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The complainants insisted, in all stages of the case, that the
compact between Virginia and Kentucky, must rule, for it
providedSEC. ixi. Seventh, that the use and navigation of the river Ohio, so
far as the territory of the proposed State, or the territory which will remain within the limits of this Commonwealth, lies thereon, shall be free
and common to the citizens of the United States, and the respective jurisdictions of this Commonwealth and of the proposed State on the river,
as aforesaid, shall be concurrent only with the States which may possess
the opposite shores of the said river: (Act of Virginia, passed December
i8, 1789; i3 Hening's Stat. 17, 2o; made part of Art. VIII. Const. 1792 of
Kentucky and Art. VI. 9, Const. 1799, and Art. VIII. 9, Const. i85o.)

In their dissenting opinions, Chief Justice TANEY and Justice
DANIEL both called attention (i 3 How. 54 U. S. 583, 6o0) to
the peculiarly general terms upon which Kentucky had been
admitted into the Union. This peculiarity also extended to
the declaration of the equality of the State in the Union :CHAP. Iv. An Act declaring the consent of Congress, that a new State
be formed within the jurisdictionof the Commonweallt of Virginia, and
admitted into this Union by the name of the State of Kentucky.

WHEREAS, the legislature of the Commonwealth of Virginia, by an Act,
entitled "An Act concerning the erection of the District of Kentucky into
one independent State," passed the eighteenth day of December, one
thousand, seven hundred and eighty-nine, have consented that the District
of Kentucky, within the jurisdiction of the said Commonwealth, and according to its actual boundaries at the time of passing the Act aforesaid,
should be formed into a new State:
AND, WHEREAS, a convention of delegates, chosen by the people of the
said District of Kentucky, have petitioned Congress to consent that, on
the first day of June, one thousand, seven hundred and ninety-two, the
said District should be formed into a new State, and received into the
Union, by the name of "The State of Kentucky."
SECTION z. Be it enacted, etc., That the Congress doth consent, that
the said District of Kentucky, within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and according to its actual boundaries on the eighteenth day of December, one thousand, seven hundred and eighty-nine,
shall, upon the first day ofJune, one thousand, seven hundred and ninetytwo, be formed into a new State, separate from and independent of the
said Commonwealth of Virginia.
SEcTION 2. And be it further enacted and declared, That upon the
aforesaid first day ofJune, one thousand, seven hundred and ninety-two,
the said new State, by the name and style of the State of Kentucky, shall
be received and admitted into this Union, as a new and entire member of
the United States of America.
APPROVED, February 4, 1791: 1 Stat. at Large i89.
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This is the whole of the Act of Congress: still, Justice
(13 How. 54 U. S. 565), and especially Justice NELSON (18 How. 59 U. S. 433) treated this as an assent of Congress to the compact, following Green v. Biddle (I823), 8
Wheat. (21 U. S.) I, 85. As this latter case remains unreversed, the opinion rendered by Justice NELSON is doubly interesting for the breadth of its scope:MCLEAN

The question here is, -whether or not the compact can operate as a restriction upon the power of Congress, under the Constitution, to regulate
commerce among the several States? Clearly not. Otherwise Congress
and two States would possess the power to modify and alter the Constitution itself.
This is so plain that it is unnecessary to pursue the argument further.
But we may refer to the case of Wilson v. Mason (I8OI), I Cranch (5 U. S.)
88, 92, where it was held that this compact, which stipulated that rights
acquired under the Commonwealth of Virginia shall be decided according
to the then existing laws, could not deprive Congress of the power to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and prevent a review where
none was given in the State law existing at the time of the compact: NEr,SON, J., Pa. v. Bridge Co. (1855), i8 How. 59 U. S. 433.

Justice DANIEL did not proceed so fundamentally, as he was
content to find in the compact no Congressional regulation:
(13 How. 54 U. S. 6oi.) Others, as Chief Justice TANEY (Id.
584, citing Pollardv. Hagan) have been content to declare
that all States, after the admission to the Union, are on an
equal footing. This case and this principle have been repeatedly
affirmed in commerce cases, in a line of decisions at present ending with Williamette Bridge Co. v. Hatchi, mentioned in the
next paragraph.
So far as the principles of Wilson v. M7ars/i Co., and the
Wheeling Bridge Case, could be affected by any compact between the States, or on their admission into the Union, a series
of cases, beginning in 1845,- and extending to March, 1888,
not only confirm the opinion of Justice NELSON, just quoted,
that the Constitutional power cannot be thus fettered; but
also establish that the power of the States over commercial matters is equally unfettered. The whole subject was
elaborately considered and the principal cases cited by Justice
BRADLEY in the Williamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatcl (1888),
125 U. S. I, with the assent of ChiefJustice WAITE and Justices
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]ITILLER, FIELD, HARLAN, MATTHEWS, GRAY, BLATCHFORD and
LAIAR.
The general principle there laid down, declared that
the freedom secured upon the navigable waters in and around
the States subject to such compacts, was a political freedom,
-whereby discrimiiation against citizens of other States was
prevented; but it was not any result of such Congressional
Tegulation and care of those waters as might be assumed at
,any time.

The case originated in the United States Circuit Court for
the District of Oregon, in an injunction proceeding for the
abatement of a bridge over the Williamette River in the State
-of Oregon, erected by the authority of that State alone. The
CircuitJudge, SAWYER, granted a preliminary injunction (April
21, 1881 : 6 Fed. Repr. 78o), and, after the testimony was
taken, a final injunction (October 22, 1881; See 19 Fed. Repr.
.349), because the Act of February 14, 1859, (II Stat. at Large
383) admitting Oregon into the Union, required freedom in
the navigable waters of the State. An appeal was taken but
-notprosecuted. After the decision in Escanaba Co. v. Chicago,
'in 1883,.a bill, of review was filed, but dismissed, upon demurrer, by the District judge DEADY, with the concurrence of
the Circuit Judge (March 3, 1884; 19 Fed. Repr. 347). This
lastdecree was then taken to the Supreme Court and there reversed, with instructions to dismiss the original bill.
This 'Oregon Case differed from Wilson v. Harsh Co.; Gilvnan v. Phila.; The PassaicBridge Cases (decided in 1857, by
Justice GRIER sitting in the 'United States Circuit Court
for the District of New Jersey, 6 AMER. LAW REGISTER 6;
S. C. 3 Wall. (70. U S.) 782, appendix), in calling for a decision upon the effect of the terms of the Admission Act,
and, in this respect, was precisely the same as the California case of Cardwell v. The American River Bridge Co.
(885), 113 U. S. 205, affirming s. c. (1884), 19 Fed. Repr.
562; the Mississippi case of Hamilton v. Vicksburg S. & P.
RR. Co. (1886), 119 U. S. 28o; the Illinois case of Escanaba
Co. v. Chicago (1883), 107 Id. 678; the case of the Illinois
river dam and lock (Huse v. Glover, 1883, U. S. Circ. Ct., N.
Dist. Ill., Iq Fed. Repr. 292; affirmed, 1886, 107 U. S. 543);
the Michigan case of Sands v.
ministee River Ivprove. Co.
VOL XXXVIII.- 3 I.
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(1887), 123 Id. 288; and the judgment in each case was the
same: that is, the legality of the bridge was sustained upon
the principles mentioned on page 474, suPra.
In the direction of Congressional action, this denial by
Justice NELSON (supra, page 480), was broadly followed by
Justice STRONG, with the assent of Chief Justice WAITE and
all the other Associate Justices-CLIFFORD, SWAYNE, MILLER,
DAVID DAVIS, FIELD, BRADLEY and HUNT, in Southl Carolinav.
Georgia (1876), 3 Otto (93 U. S.) 4, 12, where a compact between those States was made the foundation of a bill in equity
to restrain the obstruction of one of the channels of the Savannah river. Those States had agreed, April 24, 1787, that " the
navigation of the river Savannah" in certain reaches, should
"be henceforth equally free to the citizens of both States:"
and in 1874, Congress had directed the erection of a crib for
the improvement of the harbor of Savannah, which would
prevent the free use of one channel. This compact was held
to be of no strength against the commerce powers of the
United States, conferred by the Constitution of 1789, and this
Wheeling Bridge Case wag distinctly made the foundation of
the opinion.
The Wheeling Bridge Case has been already noticed in connection with Wilson v. M7arsh Co., suipra, pages 446, 447, as
differing in principle; though Chief Justice TANEY and Justice
Daniel thought otherwise, and dissented: (13 How. 54 U. S.
580, 585, 599-)
That difference of principle can be readily seen by applying
to the dam and to the bridge, the modified rule of Cooley v.
Port Wardens,supra, page 466. Both affected navigable water,
under State legislation, in the absence of particular Congressional action prohibiting the obstruction, though there were
general laws of the United States regulating vessels. While
a bridge might not, and this particular bridge, when sufficiently elevated would not be incompatible with the free navigation
of the river; still the difference between the two cases lies in
the geographical position of the water. If within a State, and
purely internal, the State has entire control: MCLEAN, J., 13
How. 54 U. S. 566 and 18 How. 59 U. S. 432; eazie v. M}foor
(1852), 14 How. (55 U. S.) 568; and the Chestnut Street Bridge

